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ECONOMIC SURVIVAL WHEN MARKETS ARE INCOMPLETE 
 





  We consider an infinite horizon economy with incomplete markets with two 
agents and one good. We begin with an example in which an agent’s equilibrium 
consumption is zero eventually with probability one even if she has correct beliefs 
and is marginally more patient. We then prove the following general result: if 
markets are eﬀectively incomplete forever then on any equilibrium path on which 
some agent’s consumption is bounded away from zero eventually, the other agent’s 
consumption is zero eventually. This implies that either some agent vanishes, in that 
she consumes zero eventually, or the consumption of both agents is arbitrarily close 
to zero infinitely often. Later we show that the first possibility is a robust outcome 
since for a wide class of economies with incomplete markets, there are equilibria in 
which an agent’s consumption is zero eventually with probability one even though 
she has correct beliefs as in the example. Our results mark a sharp contrast with the 
case studied by Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2004) where markets are 
complete. 
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General equilibrium models are useful in explaining the behaviour of consumption and
that of the prices of goods and assets in a wide class of economies with heterogeneous
agents; when markets are dynamically complete, the asymptotic behaviour of these quan-
tities is completely understood. Indeed, for some time now it has been known that if
agents have homogeneous beliefs (even if they are not correct) and the same degree of
impatience, Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations implies that the consumption of
every agent must be bounded away from zero, i.e. every agent “dominates” (this technical
term has become standard in the literature and corresponds to the word “survive” in less
formal parlance), regardless of attitudes towards risk; furthermore, if agents diﬀer in their
degree of impatience, then in the long run only the most patient have positive wealth,
consume the entire output of the economy, and determine prices regardless of the agents’
preferences towards risk. The result was conjectured by Ramsey (1928 pp. 558-559) and
later proved by Becker (1980), Rader (1981) and Bewley (1982). The line of research
was completed by considering the case with heterogeneous beliefs, results due to Sandroni
(2000) and Blume and Easley (2004).1 Sandroni considered a Lucas tree economy with
dynamically complete markets and populated by expected utility maximizers. He showed
that among agents with the same discount factor, traders who eventually accurately pre-
dict inﬁnite horizon events, and only those traders, have positive wealth eventually, i.e.
do not “vanish”; in the absence of such accurate predictors, the entropy of beliefs deter-
mines survival and investors whose forecasts are persistently wrong vanish in the presence
of a learner. Blume and Easley (2004) showed that Pareto optimality of the allocation
guarantees the results. One concludes that in dynamically complete market economies,
survival depends only on the degree of impatience and the accuracy of beliefs since the
equilibrium allocation is necessarily Pareto optimal; attitudes toward risk are irrelevant.
This is signiﬁcant because it appears to validate the market selection hypothesis (hence-
forth, MSH) which, in the weak form due to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953), requires
that only agents whose behaviour is consistent with rational and informed maximization
of returns can survive and aﬀect prices in the long run.2
The fact that survival depends only on discount factors and the accuracy of beliefs
could reﬂect an intrinsic property of competitive markets; it could also be driven by the
assumption that markets are dynamically complete. Very little is known about this and
1Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2004) respond to the earlier work of Blume and Easley
(1992), a pioneering paper that studied the general equilibrium dynamics of wealth accumulation when
agents use ﬁxed savings rates and arbitrary portfolio rules. It showed that a trader with correct beliefs
who uses a portfolio rule that does not lead to the maximization of the one period ahead expected value
of the logarithm of wealth (the Kelly criterion) need not dominate. The principal criticism of that result
is that agents do not optimally choose consumption and saving in an intertemporal framework.
2There is more than one view of what constitutes the MSH. Authors like Cootner (1967) and Fama
(1965) oﬀered a stronger version of the MSH which claims that markets select for investors with correct
beliefs. A common implication of both versions is that rational expectations models are appropriate to
describe long run outcomes. The stronger version of the MSH due to Cootner (1967) and Fama (1965)
implies also that in the long run correct beliefs can be inferred from equilibrium prices.
3that is the question we address by considering an inﬁnite horizon economy with only one
good, two agents, a single short lived inside asset, and dynamically incomplete markets.
We begin with a leading example where agent 1 has arbitrary CRRA preferences and
a positive stochastic endowment forever, and agent 2 has logarithmic preferences and a
positive endowment only at date zero. We show that even if agents are equally patient
and have correct beliefs, one can ﬁnd a time invariant asset structure such that the
consumption of the agent with logarithmic preferences converges to zero with probability
one in every equilibrium. A continuity argument shows that the same is true even if agent
2 is marginally more patient or if she holds correct beliefs and agent 1 does not.
The example shows that the factors determining survival with complete markets have
little relevance when markets are dynamically incomplete. As for the MSH in dynamically
incomplete markets economies, no entropy measure that depends only on the truth, beliefs,
and the market structure can be critical to understanding survival because any properly
deﬁned entropy measure must attain its maximum when beliefs are correct and yet, as
per the example, survival is not guaranteed.3
Our example suggests two rather diﬀerent conjectures about the implications of market
incompleteness in inﬁnite horizon economies where the Euler equations always hold with
equality: (a) that the consumption of some agent is zero eventually, and the weaker
statement (b) that the consumption of some agent comes arbitrarily close to zero inﬁnitely
often. Our theorems reﬁne and strengthen these conjectures.
Before proceeding it is useful to recall the economics that drives the result when
markets are complete. In such a framework, at an interior allocation, the utility gradients
of the diﬀerent agents point in the same direction. It follows that with preferences that
are additively separable across time, the ratio of (the one-period ahead intertemporal)
marginal rates of substitution–which, we recall, include beliefs that could be subjectively
held, i.e. heterogeneous and incorrect–of the two agents weighted by the discount factors
is one independent of the date and event; that is the key implication of Pareto optimality
and that drives all the results. In particular, if both the agents have correct beliefs and
the same discount factor then consumption of both is uniformly positive eventually.
Our approach is to write the ratio of (the one-period ahead ratio of the) marginal
utilities–the derivatives of the Bernoulli functions–of the two agents as the ratio of two
stochastic processes where each is the product of conditional mean one random variables.
At any Pareto optimal allocation with homogeneous beliefs, that ratio is degenerate. The
key implication of market incompleteness is that, typically, the utility gradients of diﬀerent
agents are not aligned and the ratio is not degenerate; in fact, with uniformly positive
asset returns, the ratio of marginal utilities grows with positive conditional probability
since otherwise one of the two Euler equations would not hold with equality.
3This resolves an open question posed by Sandroni (2004 on page 10) in response to an example in
Blume and Easley (2004), discussed in footnote 10 below, as the following quotation indicates: “The
results in this paper can only suggest, but they do not prove, that belief accuracy measured by a properly
deﬁned entropy measure is critical for survival in dynamic incomplete market economies.”
4Our main result is very intuitive since it is based on the observation that on almost
every path one can have arbitrarily long strings of states where the ratio of marginal
utilities keeps rising since, as we noted above, the ratio must grow with positive conditional
probability whenever the marginal rates of substitution diﬀer and the Euler equations hold
with equality. This fact can be shown to imply that if a prespeciﬁed agent has consumption
that is uniformly positive inﬁnitely often then, for the other agent, every prespeciﬁed
lower bound on consumption is violated inﬁnitely often; the technical tool used is Levy’s
conditional form of the Second Borel-Cantelli Lemma further generalized by Freedman
(1973). More formally, in Theorem 1 (i) we show that if the ratio of marginal rates
of substitution does not display one period ahead conditional variability asymptotically,
then the marginal rates of substitution are equalized in the limit. Theorem 1 (ii) shows
that if, on the other hand, the ratio of marginal utilities does display one period ahead
conditional variability, then the only way that some agent can have uniformly positive
consumption eventually is if the other agent consumes zero eventually.4 Simply put, if
market incompleteness is eﬀective forever then either (a) one of the two agents will cease
to consume eventually, as in the example, or (b) the equilibrium is complicated in that
the consumption of both agents will be arbitrarily close to zero inﬁnitely often. The
result applies equally regardless of whether beliefs are homogeneous or heterogeneous.5
For Theorem 1 we assume that the asset pays a uniformly positive amount and that the
one period ahead conditional probability of the occurrence of a state is uniformly positive,
assumptions that are standard although they can be weakened.
T h e o r e m1s h o w st h a te x a m p l e so fi n ﬁnite horizon economies with incomplete markets
that have appeared in the literature are very special. In many of those examples, after
some ﬁnite date the continuation economy has complete markets.6 In others, though
markets are always incomplete, the asset structure is speciﬁed in a manner that ensures
that trading possibilities are so narrow that the idea behind our proof of Theorem 1 (ii)
has no bite. There is one further possibility that is not covered by our discussion so far,
namely, that the ratio of marginal utilities does not display one period ahead variability
even though the ratio of marginal rates of substitution does display such variability so
that both the agents have consumption uniformly bounded away from zero. Such a case is
4Krebs (2004a) considers a two agent incomplete markets economy with idiosyncratic risk and homo-
geneous beliefs, and shows that the range of the equilibrium consumption process cannot be a compact
set with a strictly positive lower bound (the possibility that the lower bound is zero is ruled out by his
assumption that the Bernoulli utility function is unbounded below); from his analysis one cannot conclude
whether zero is or is not approached. Like us, he considers equilibria in which the Euler equations hold
with equality; the only asset that he allows for is a Lucas-tree with uniformly positive dividends. Our
result shows that, very generally, not only is zero approached for some agent but inﬁnitely often so.
5Our result also applies to economies with a retradable long lived asset provided that the asset has
strictly positive returns–we do not consider such economies for notational simplicity. Duﬃe et al (1994)
provide an existence theorem for Lucas-tree economies with incomplete markets in which consumption is
uniformly bounded away from zero. For their result it is crucial that there are no short sales and no one
period inside assets either.
6Although this feature is very useful in constructing examples, it clearly goes against the motivation
for studying models with incomplete markets.
5very special and can arise only with well chosen heterogeneous beliefs; Coury and Sciubba
(2005) provide such an example.7 All of these examples are discussed in Section 4.3.
The ﬁrst of the two possibilities delineated in Theorem 1 (ii) is surprising and one
is tempted to believe that it is fragile. Such a conclusion is unwarranted since one can
show that, when beliefs are correct, for any feasible consumption processes that satisfy
the Euler equations, and that have the additional property that the one period ahead
marginal valuation of the asset is predetermined for an agent, as in the leading example,
that agent consumes zero eventually on almost every path. To see why, notice that,
by no arbitrage, the discounted marginal value of investing in the asset is a conditional
mean one random variable so the discounted marginal value of the “holding” strategy
that invests one unit of the numeraire in the asset at date 0 and then reinvests the
proceeds forever is the product of conditional mean one random variables; the latter
converges to zero when it is nondegenerate and we know that it is degenerate for one
agent (by the “predeterminedness” property) and nondegenerate for the other (by market
incompleteness). But because of the degeneracy of the process, the agent’s consumption
converges to zero whenever the discounted return to the holding strategy converges to zero;
the latter must happen because the discounted marginal value of the holding strategy does
converge to zero for the other agent and that agent’s marginal utility is bounded away
from zero. Theorem 4 shows that, for a robust family of endowment distributions, there
exist such consumption processes that have summable supporting prices and so such
economies have equilibria with correct beliefs in which the same agent consumes zero
eventually on almost every path; the result appears to require a fairly strong restriction
on the distribution of endowments across agents and little else.
The proof of Theorem 4 proposes a method that generates consumption processes with
the stated properties that are uniquely speciﬁed, continuous, and monotone for each value
of consumption at the initial date. We obtain a family of “no trade” equilibria that are
supported with trivial asset portfolios so that the portfolio process is uniformly bounded.8
We then show that for each such no trade equilibrium, there is an open set of endowment
distributions that leads to an equilibrium that is weaker in that there may be no uniform
bound across paths on debt. This equilibrium concept requires maximization subject to
a sequence of budget constraints and a single transversality condition at date zero, and
market clearing. We prove that it does not permit Ponzi schemes.9
7Their construction appears to be special since they start with a Pareto optimal allocation that can
be supported as an equilibrium with incomplete markets with homogeneous beliefs, and then they change
beliefs and/or discount factors in a manner that leaves demand behaviour unchanged so that the same
allocation continues to specify equilibrium consumption in the economy with heterogeneous beliefs.
8This boundedness property, that is often equivalent to requiring a transversality condition at every
date and event, has been proposed as a desirable property of equilibria in inﬁnite horizon economies by
Magill and Quinzii (1994), Levine and Zame (1996), Hernandez and Santos (1996), and Florenzano and
Gourdel (1996). It is usually justiﬁed by appealing to an unmodelled institutional device that ensures
that the economy is immune to Ponzi schemes.
9So our equilibrium concept provides a less demanding institutional framework that achieves the
purpose noted in footnote 8. Santos and Woodford (1997) propose a notion of equilibrium without
6Now that we have discussed our results in some detail, we turn to an example in
Blume and Easley (2004) on the asymptotic behaviour of equilibrium consumption in an
inﬁnite horizon incomplete market economy that, to the best of our knowledge, is the only
paper in the literature that addresses the question of survival in such economies. Their
example is of an economy with a single good, a single inside asset, and three agents where
agents one and two are identical except for the fact that agent one has correct beliefs and
agent two does not. Agent three also has correct beliefs and is the most patient of the
three. Their approach is to construct the endowment process of the third agent so as to
support prespeciﬁed prices for the asset and rules for consumption for all three agents.
They show that their example economy has an equilibrium in which agent one, who has
correct beliefs, is driven out and the other two agents, one with correct beliefs and the
other with incorrect beliefs, survive. In their example the economy is deterministic but
agent two mistakenly believes it to be stochastic and her beliefs about the return from
the asset induce her to save a larger fraction of her wealth than agent one every period.
They conclude that wrong beliefs can lead to a higher saving rate and thereby determine
survival. It is evident that in their economy if also agent two had correct beliefs then
the economy would be determinisic and believed to be so by all the agents; so markets
would be complete and the behaviour of consumption is determined only by the rates of
impatience. So their example does not yield any additional insight about the behaviour
of consumption under incomplete markets when beliefs are homogeneous and this is in
sharp contrast to our leading example; moreover, it is not obvious that their technique
permits unequivocal conclusions in more general settings where, for example, saving rates
across agents are not unambiguously ordered along a path as in their example.10
The technique used in analyzing our example constitutes an application of a method-
ological innovation that we now describe. It is well known that the study of the asymptotic
behaviour of equilibrium consumption is equivalent to the study of the evolution through
time of the ratio of marginal utilities. When markets are complete, Pareto optimality of
the allocation implies that the behaviour of the ratio of marginal utilities is completely
pinned down by the behaviour of the processes of subjective beliefs and these were studied
by Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2004) exhaustively. Nothing was known about
how a similar analysis could be carried out when markets are incomplete and the Blume
and Easley (2004) example did not shed any light on the problem. Our methodological
contribution is to show that the ratio of marginal utilities can be written as the ratio
of two stochastic processes where each is the product of conditional mean one random
variables. As the earlier detailed discussion of our results indicated, that methodological
uniform bounds for a much more general set-up. Blume and Easley (2004) provide an example in which
the equilibrium value of an agent’s debt diverges according to the agent’s subjectively held belief.
10Furthermore, completing the market in their example leads to nonexistence, a fact that they note
while in our leading example doing so leads to an equilibrium where the allocation is Pareto optimal and,
by the result in Blume and Easley (2004), both the agents dominate.
These authors present a second example that shows that there are situations in which relative entropy
i ss i m p l yt h ew r o n gm e a s u r eo fb e l i e fa c c u r a c yb e c a u s ei td o e sn o tm a t c hw e l lw i t ht h ea s s e ts t r u c t u r e .
7innovation is key in that it lets us use Levy’s result to prove Theorem 1 and carry out
our construction to prove Theorems 3 and 4.
Our work has implications for the MSH which we now highlight. As mentioned above,
based on their example, Blume and Easley (2004) conclude that the accuracy of beliefs is
not the key that explains survival and that the MSH may fail because wrong beliefs can
lead to greater savings, a point also made by Sandroni (2004). Our Theorem 4 indicates
that market incompleteness can lead to very rich consumption dynamics even when all
agents hold correct beliefs and so it suggests that, at the margin, market incompleteness
rather than beliefs determines the fate of the trader. Furthermore, our example, where
agents with correct beliefs are driven out by agents with wrong beliefs, makes very clear
that even the version of the MSH due to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) does not hold
in general. Coury and Sciubba (2005) argue that, when markets are incomplete, agents
with wrong beliefs may survive and so one cannot infer the true probability distribution
by only observing asset prices; their claim is based upon assuming the existence of an
equilibrium where an agent with correct beliefs has consumption that is uniformly positive
inﬁnitely often and then showing that there must exist an economy with heterogeneous
beliefs with the same consumption proﬁles. Since prices are “as if” agents had correct
beliefs, their result casts some doubt on the version of the MSH due to Cootner (1967)
and Fama (1965) but it is consistent with the version due to Alchian (1950) and Friedman
(1953).
To summarize, for inﬁnite horizon economies with two agents and one short-lived asset
the paper provides a complete characterization of limiting consumption behaviour when
markets are incomplete, shows that to get simple limiting behaviour one agent must be
driven out of the market, and shows that such a possibility is a robust outcome. In doing
so, it contributes to the general equilibrium literature, and so to the modern literature in
macroeconomics, by pointing out hitherto unknown properties of such economies; it also
makes clear that the MSH is valid in a robust sense only if the equilibrium allocation is
Pareto optimal. Finally, the method for constructing equilibria that we propose sheds
light on the structure of the equilibrium set when markets are incomplete,11 and could be
of use to researchers in the area of computational general equilibrium.
In Section 2 we introduce the model and deﬁne the relevant notions of survival. Section
3 contains the leading example. Afterwards, in Section 4 we develop the general approach
to study the long run dynamics of equilibria and present Theorem 1 and our discussion
of earlier examples in the literature. Finally, in Section 5 we construct the equilibria in
which only one agent survives. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. All the
proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
11Very little is known about this beyond the analysis in Levine and Zame (2001) for the case of one
good economies with idiosyncratic shocks and increasing patience.
82. MODEL
2.1 PROBABILITY NOTATION
We consider an inﬁnite horizon with dates t =0 ,1,2,···. The temporal state space
is S := {1,2,···,S}. St is the t-fold Cartesian product of S and Ω := S∞ with typical
element ω =( s1,s 2,···)w h e r est is the realization at date t ≥ 1. In fact, we shall write
ω =( s1(ω),s 2(ω),···). Also st =( s1,···,s t) and if we wish to make the dependence on ω
explicit, we shall use st(ω): =( s1(ω),···,s t(ω)). Ω(st): ={ω ∈ Ω : ω =( st,s t+1,···),s t ∈
St} is a t-cylinder and Ft is the σ-algebra obtained by considering ﬁnite unions of the
sets Ω(st)f o rﬁxed t. This induces a sequence of σ-algebras on Ω denoted {Ft}∞
t=1 where




⊂ F.T h a ti so u r
ﬁltration with F a σ-algebra on Ω. All statements will be made using (Ω,F).
Any function X : Ω → R that is F-measurable is a random variable.F r o mh e r eo na
process denotes X = {Xt}∞
t=0 with Xt : Ω → R and Ft-measurable.
For Q : F → [0,1] a probability measure, let dQt be the Ft measurable function
deﬁned by dQt(ω): =Q(Ω(st(ω))) for t ≥ 1a n ddQ0 := 1, i.e. dQt(ω) is the probability
of the cylinder Ω(st(ω)). We also deﬁne the one period ahead conditional probability that
state s occurs by Qt(ω): =
dQt(ω)
dQt−1(ω). EQ[X|G] denotes the expectation operator applied to
the random variable X : Ω → R restricted to the σ-algebra G where G ⊂ F and where the
expectation is taken with respect to the measure Q. EQ[X|G]i saG-measurable random
variable. Recall that L∞(Ω,F,Q) denotes the (equivalence class of) measurable functions
that are bounded in the essential sup norm with respect to the measure Q.W ed e ﬁne12
Ψt := {f : Ω → R : f isFt − measurable} Ψ
t,Q
+ := {f ∈ Ψt : f(ω) ≥ 0 Q − a.s.ω}
ΨQ := {(f0,f 1,···) ∈ ×∞
t=0Ψt :s u p t≥0 esssupω∈Ω;Q|ft(ω)| < ∞}
Ψ
Q
+ := {(f0,f 1,···) ∈ ×∞
t=0Ψt
+ :s u p t≥0 esssupω∈Ω;Q|ft(ω)| < ∞}.
2.2 THE ECONOMY
There is only one perishable good at each date. An agent is denoted i ∈ I.T h e r ea r e
two agents, so I := {1,2}, each of whom lives forever.
ω ∈ Ω is chosen according to the objective probability measure P while agent i’s
subjective belief is denoted Pi.( Ω,F,P) is the objective probability triple. (Ω,F,P i),
i =1 ,2, are the triples used by the agents’ for their decisions. We shall assume that
the one period ahead conditional probability that state s occurs is uniformly positive and
agents correctly believe it to be so.13 So, deﬁne p := inft≥0 ess. infω∈Ω;P Pt(ω).
ASSUMPTION A.1: 0 <p≤ inft≥0 ess. infω∈Ω;Pi Pi,t(ω).
The aggregate endowment process is denoted Z := {Zt}∞
t=0 and its range is [z, ¯ z]s o
that for all t ≥ 0, Zt(ω) ∈ [z, ¯ z] P−a.s. ω.T h e endowment process of i is denoted
zi := {zi,t}∞
t=0, a nonnegative process. Of course, z1+z2 = Z; we also assume that the set
12For h an F-measurable function, the notation esssupω∈Ω;Qh is used to denote the essential supremum
of h taken over the set Ω with respect to the measure Q.
13This assumption is standard in the literature (see Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2004)).
9Ft,i nt h eﬁltration {Ft}∞
t=0, is generated by the union of σ(z1,t)a n dσ(z2,t)w h e r e ,f o ra
random variable X, σ(X)i st h eσ-algebra generated by X.




ui is i’s state independent Bernoulli utility function. βi is agent i’s discount factor.
ASSUMPTION A.3: For i ∈ I (i) ui : R+ → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and C2 with limc→0+u0
i(c)=∞ and (ii) βi ∈ (0,1).
To prove Theorem 4 we need to impose a bound on the degree of relative risk aversion.




i(c) for all c>0.
There is a single one period asset available in zero net supply. Its return is r,w h e r er
is a process with range [r, ¯ r]s ot h a tf o ra l lt ≥ 0, rt(ω) ∈ [r, ¯ r] P−a.s. ω. r is assumed to
be uniformly positive so Arrow securities are ruled out; the role of this restriction will be
discussed in Section 4.2. The asset trades at the price process q.
ASSUMPTION A.5: [r, ¯ r] ⊂ R++.
The next assumption will be used to prove that the consumption processes that we
construct and use in Theorems 3 and 4 are supportable as equilibria. Notice that, under
A.2-3 and A.5, M<∞ where M is speciﬁed in A.6.












We shall impose one further assumption; it wi l lb es t a t e da n dd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n5 . 1 .
REMARK 1: Assumptions A.4 and A.6 will be used only in Section 5. Weaker versions
of these assumptions that take into account speciﬁc details of the endowment process and
asset return process suﬃc ef o rT h e o r e m4t og ot h r o u g h . T h e ya r en o ts t a t e df o r m a l l y
since the gain in generality is not justiﬁed by the notational complication.
An economy is a list (P,Z,P1,P 2,β 1,β 2,u 1,u 2,r). A private ownership economy is a list
(P,z1,z 2,P 1,P 2,β 1,β 2,u 1,u 2,r) and is related to an economy by the relation Z = z1 +z2.
The consumption process of i is denoted ci.W er e q u i r eci ∈ Ψ
Pi
+ and for such a ci,t h e
utility payoﬀ is given by limT→+∞
PT
t=0 βt
i EPi[ui(ci,t)|F0](ω). i’s holding of the asset is a
process denoted θi. θi,−1(ω) = 0 is introduced as a convenient notational convention.
The pair (c1,c 2)i sfeasible if ci ∈ Ψ
Pi
+ for i ∈ I and at every t ≥ 0, c1,t(ω)+c2,t(ω)=
Zt(ω) P−a.s. ω.Amarket clearing allocation consists of (c1,c 2,θ 1,θ 2)s u c ht h a t( c1,c 2)
is feasible and, at every t ≥ 0, θ1,t(ω)+θ2,t(ω)=0P−a.s. ω.
At each pair (ω,t), agents trade in the asset market and in the spot market for the
good. Since there is only one good, given q and zi,e a c hci determines one and only one
10θi. Given the consumption process ci, θi is a supporting portfolio process at the prices q if
(i) θi,t ∈ Ψt,Pi ∀t ≥ 0a n d
(ii) ∀t ≥ 0,c i,t(ω)+qt(ω) · θi,t(ω) ≤ zi,t(ω)+rt(ω) · θi,t−1(ω) Pi − a.s.ω.
2.3 EQUILIBRIUM–NECESSARY CONDITIONS
A notion of equilibrium in our model economy requires the speciﬁcation of a budget
set subject to which each agent maximizes. Evidently, the budget set will incorporate a
sequence of budget constraints, i.e. it will require the existence of a supporting portfolio
process; additional conditions will be imposed to guarantee that a maximizer exists.






+ : ∀t ≥ 0,p t(ω)·qt(ω)=EQ[pt+1·rt+1|Ft](ω) Q−a.s.ω
o
,
where we have one degree of freedom (normalization), the set of Arrow price processes
f o rt h ea s s e tp r i c ep r o c e s sq and the measure Q. The no arbitrage property requires that
P(q;Q) 6= ∅ where Q = P,Pi (Q = P when beliefs are correct).
In our framework, at any interior solution to the maximization problem with a sup-
porting portfolio process a set of ﬁrst order conditions necessarily hold with equality. Say
that ci is an Euler process at the price process q if






Evidently, if ci is an Euler process at the price process q then P(q;Pi) 6= ∅.
Furthermore, in inﬁnite horizon models one must also rule out Ponzi schemes, i.e. a
trading plan that generates income at a date-event and rolls over debt in a manner that
prevents an income loss at every other date-event, since, with monotonically increasing
preferences, the existence of a Ponzi scheme in the budget set would imply that there is
no maximizer and therefore no equilibrium. We deﬁne a Ponzi scheme at a no arbitrage
price process q as in Magill and Quinzii (1994).
DEFINITION 1: Given i,l e tq be such that P(q;Pi) 6= ∅.A Ponzi scheme is a θ and
ap a i r( ω0,t 0) such that (i) θt ∈ Ψt,Pi ∀t ≥ 0, (ii) θt(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω if t<t 0 and
θt(ω)=0f o ra l lt if ω/ ∈ Ω(st(ω0)),
−1=qt0(ω0) · θt0(ω0),
0=rt(ω) · θt−1(ω) − qt(ω) · θt(ω)f o r a l l t ≥ t0 +1a n dPi − a.s.ω.
2.4 IDC EQUILIBRIUM
We introduce a notion of equilibrium with uniform bounds on the value of debt. i’s





+ :t h e r e e x i s t s θi, with θi,t ∈ Ψt,Pi ∀t ≥ 0, such that
∀t ≥ 0,c i,t(ω)+qt(ω) · θi,t(ω) ≤ zi,t(ω)+rt(ω) · θi,t−1(ω) Pi − a.s.ω,
supt≥0 esssupω∈Ω;Pi |qt(ω) · θi,t(ω)| < ∞
o
.
11The ﬁrst set of conditions require that the consumption process be in i’s consumption
set, the second that there exists a supporting portfolio process, and the last condition
is an implicit debt constraint that requires that the value of debt be uniformly bounded.
Implicit debt constraints have been treated extensively in earlier literature on incomplete
market economies with an inﬁnite time horizon, e.g. Magill and Quinzii (1994) who
provide conditions such that in any equilibrium where a transversality condition holds at
every date-event, the value of debt is uniformly bounded.
For i, ci is an IDC maximizer given q if (i) ci ∈ BCi(q) and (ii) there is no ˜ ci ∈ BCi(q),












2,q∗) that is a market clearing
allocation and, for i ∈ I, c∗
i, with supporting portfolio θ∗
i,i sa nI D Cm a x i m i z e rg i v e nq∗.
In an IDC equilibrium, an agent maximizes discounted expected utility by choosing
a process for consumption, i.e. {ci,t}
+∞
t=0 with the restriction that, for all t, ci,t is Ft-
measurable, that the spot market budget constraints are met, and an additional condition
is met so as to ensure that the budget sets are appropriately bounded so that a maximizer
exists. The IDC budget set does not permit Ponzi schemes (see Magill and Quinzii (1994)).
2.5 SURVIVAL
We formalize the various notions of asymptotic behaviour that we shall use by following
the deﬁnitions that have been established in the literature.
DEFINITION 3: Fix a path ω.
Agent i dominates on ω if liminft ci,t(ω) > 0.
Agent i survives on ω if liminft ci,t(ω) = 0 and limsupt ci,t(ω) > 0.
Agent i vanishes on ω if limsupt ci,t(ω)=0 .
The deﬁnitions given are made operational by considering the behaviour of marginal







The proof of the following lemma is straightforward hence omitted.
LEMMA 1: Assume A.3. Then
agent 2 dominates on ω ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ liminft yt(ω) ≤ limsupt yt(ω) < ∞;
agent 2 survives on ω ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ liminft yt(ω) < limsupt yt(ω)=∞;
agent 2 vanishes on ω ⇐⇒ limt yt(ω)=∞.
The corresponding results for agent 1 are obtained by studying the behaviour of 1/yt(ω).
Both the agents dominate on ω if and only if 0 < liminft yt(ω) ≤ limsupt yt(ω) < ∞.
123. A LEADING EXAMPLE
We turn to our example which has ﬁve salient features. (i) u1(x)=( 1 /(1 − a))x1−a
with a>0a n da 6=1 ,a n du2(x)=l o gx.( i i )z2,0(ω)=Z0(ω)a n dz2,t(ω)=0o t h e r w i s e .
(iii) The uncertainty in the model comes from 1’s endowment which follows an i.i.d.
process with two points in its support: Z ∈ {z, ¯ z} with probability p ∈ (0,1) and (1 − p)
respectively. (iv) The asset is on the aggregate endowment so rt(ω)=Zt(ω). (v) The
beliefs of each agent are (pi,(1−pi)) with pi ∈ (0,1) and both could hold incorrect beliefs.
It is known that 2’s optimal decision rule is
c2,t(ω)=( 1− β2) · w2,t(ω)a n dθ2,t(ω)=β2 · [w2,t(ω)/qt(ω)]
where w2,t(ω)=rt(ω)·θ2,t−1(ω)=Zt(ω)·θ2,t−1(ω)s ot h a ti ti si n d e p e n d e n to fp2. It follows
that at a feasible allocation where agent 2 optimizes given prices qt(ω), in particular
at equilibrium, θ2,t(ω)=β2 · [Zt(ω) · θ2,t−1(ω)/qt(ω)] so that such prices, in particular
equilibrium prices, must satisfy
qt(ω)=β2 · Zt(ω) · [θ2,t−1(ω)/θ2,t(ω)].
As for 1, when agent 2 optimizes and the allocation is feasible, we must have
c1,t(ω)=Zt(ω) − c2,t(ω)=Zt(ω) − (1 − β2) · w2,t(ω)=Zt(ω)[1 − (1 − β2) · θ2,t−1(ω)].
Furthermore, the ﬁrst order conditions for 1 are
β1 EP1[(c1,t)
−a · Zt|Ft−1](ω)=qt−1(ω) · (c1,t−1(ω))
−a
w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a trt(ω)=Zt(ω).
By substituting for c1,t and qt−1 we obtain
β1 EP1
h³









Zt−1(ω)[1 − (1 − β2) · θ2,t−2(ω)]
´−a
.
We have obtained a stochastic diﬀerence equation in θ2,t such that if an allocation is
feasible, if it is maximizing for 2, and if it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions for 1 then θ2,t
must satisfy the diﬀerence equation; therefore, a θ2,t process that obtains in equilibrium
will satisfy the stochastic diﬀerence equation.14




(1 − β2) · θ2,t−1(ω)




(1 − β2) · θ2,t−2(ω)
[1 − (1 − β2) · θ2,t−2(ω)]a.
It follows that if (1 −β2) · θ2,t−1(ω) ∈ (0,1) then (1 −β2) ·θ2,t(ω) ∈ (0,1) and the system
has a real valued solution. By iterating we see that
⇔
(1 − β2) · θ2,T(ω)













(1 − β2) · θ2,0(ω)





µ (1 − β2) · θ2,T(ω)
























µ (1 − β2) · θ2,0(ω)
[1 − (1 − β2) · θ2,0(ω)]a
¶
.







1−a] P − a.s.















< 0 P − a.s.
It follows that if p1 = p,s ot h a t1 ’ sb e l i e f sa r ec o r r e c t ,a n dβ1 = β2 = β, so that both the
agents are equally impatient, then
log
µ (1 − β) · θ2,T(ω)
[1 − (1 − β) · θ2,T(ω)]a
¶
→− ∞ P − a.s.
⇔
µ (1 − β) · θ2,T(ω)
[1 − (1 − β) · θ2,T(ω)]a
¶
→ 0 ⇔ θ2,T(ω) → 0 ⇔ c2,T(ω) → 0 P − a.s.
and so in every equilibrium of the example, agent 2 vanishes with probability one.
Since the application of Jensen’s inequality above is strict, agent 2 could have correct
beliefs and agent 1 could have incorrect ones in an open set around p a n d1c o u l de v e nb e
marginally more impatient than 2, and yet 2 vanishes almost surely in every equilibrium.
The example shows very clearly that no entropy measure that depends only on the
truth, beliefs, and the market structure, can be critical to understanding survival because
any properly deﬁned entropy measure must attain its maximum when beliefs are correct.
The phenomenon in the example hinges on two crucial elements that we verify in Re-
mark 2: market incompleteness ensures that the “holding” strategy of reinvesting induces
a discounted return that converges to zero, and agent 2’s discounted marginal utility
diverges since her marginal valuation of the asset at date t is Ft−1−measurable, i.e. de-
generate. As we remark after presenting Proposition 1 in Section 4.1, these two facts
together lead to the result that agent 2’s consumption converges to zero with probability
one.
REMARK 2: We note the following features of the example. Since c2,t(ω)=( 1 −β2)·rt(ω)·
θ2,t−1(ω), qt(ω)·θ2,t(ω)=β2·w2,t(ω)=β2·(c2,t(ω)/(1−β2)) so debt is uniformly bounded
in any equilibrium since consumption is nonnegative and bounded by the uniform upper









· θT(ω) → 0 P − a.s.,
so the “holding” strategy induces a discounted return that converges to zero.
For later reference we note that rt(ω) · u0
2(c2,t(ω)) = rt(ω)/c2,t(ω)=1 /((1 − β2) ·
θ2,t−1(ω)); so rt(ω)·u0
2(c2,t(ω)) is an Ft−1−measurable quantity. Also, with some algebra,
14var
∙ rt · u0
1(c1,t)
EP1 [rt · u0
1(c1,t)|Ft−1]





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸
(ω) > 0.
So the assumption that we introduce as A.7 in Section 5.1 holds in the example.
The analysis in this section depends heavily on the endowment structure where 2 has
no endowment except in period 0. Theorem 4 will show that, in fact, the property we
identify is robust to changes in the endowment process, preferences, and asset structure.
3.1 THE GENERAL LESSON
The example in Section 3 is indicative of a very interesting phenomenon that appears to
be driven by the fact that markets are incomplete. In fact the phenomenon in the example
leads to two rather diﬀerent conjectures about the implications of market incompleteness:
(a) that the consumption of some agent stays close to zero eventually, and the weaker
statement (b) that the consumption of some agent is arbitrarily close to zero inﬁnitely
often. We would like to pin down the extent to which these results are a general property of
economies with dynamically incomplete markets. With appropriate formalizations of the
fact that markets are eﬀectively incomplete forever, Theorem 1 in Section 4.2 will show
that either (a) holds or (b) holds for both agents. More precisely, Theorem 1 (ii) will
show that on every path on which the ratio of the (one period ahead ratio of) marginal
utilities, yt/yt−1, displays variability and the consumption of some agent is uniformly
positive eventually, the consumption of the other agent is zero eventually. Theorem 4 in
Section 5.5 will show that, in a robust class of economies, there are equilibria in which the
consumption of an agent stays close to zero eventually on every path. We remark that
Theorem 1 holds regardless of whether beliefs are homogeneous or heterogeneous. Also,
one expects a version of Theorem 1 to hold in speciﬁcations of inﬁnite horizon economies
with incomplete markets that are not covered by our analysis so long as the Euler equation
holds with equality always; in particular, the asset could be retradable and long lived.
4. RULING OUT DOMINANCE
In this section we prove our main result: on paths on which an agent’s consumption
is uniformly positive eventually, the other agent’s consumption is zero eventually. So, in
contrast to the case where markets are complete, both agents cannot consume uniformly
positive quantities eventually when market are incomplete. To be able to prove the result,
we use an implication of the fact that the Euler equations hold with equality, namely, that
if the ratio of marginal utilities, yt, displays conditional variability, then it increases with
positive conditional probability. First, in Section 4.1, we introduce a transformation
that makes the study of the process yt easier and identify some key properties that the
transformed process satisﬁes. This reformulation is valid even when the subjective beliefs
of the agents do not coincide with the truth and are not homogeneous. Then, in Section
4.2 we state and discuss Theorem 1. Section 4.3 relates our result to examples of inﬁnite
horizon economies with incomplete markets that have appeared in the literature.
154.1 FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
As Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2004) show, in the case where markets
are complete, the behaviour of the variable yt is rather simply determined by the ratio of
the discount factors, the ratio of the posterior beliefs of agents, and an initial condition.
In Proposition 1 we show that, when markets are incomplete, the behaviour of yt can be
captured succinctly using the ratio of two processes where each is the product of random
variables with conditional mean one (taken with respect to the subjectively held belief)
in addition to the ratio of the discount factors and an initial condition.









PROPOSITION 1: Assume A.2, A.3, and A.5. Then EPi [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω)=1 . Furthermore,















































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
#
(ω).
P r o p o s i t i o n1( i )s h o w st h a tt h ev a r i a b l et h a tw eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed, Ri,T,i se x a c t l yt h e
discounted marginal value of the “holding” strategy of reinvesting. Proposition 3 will show
that under a mild nondegeneracy condition on the tail behaviour of ˆ ri,t, Ri,T converges
to zero. It then follows from Proposition 1 (i) that the “holding” strategy of reinvesting
induces a discounted return that converges to zero, ΠT
t=0
β2·rt+1(ω)
qt(ω) → 0 P −a.s. If we have
the further property that ˆ r2,t is degenerate, then, by a further application of Proposition
1 (i), agent 2’s consumption will converge to zero with probability one. This possibility
will be explored further in Section 5.
REMARK 3: When we consider Pareto optimal allocations obtainable as competitive
equilibria, (β2/β1)·
P2,T(ω)











P2,t(ω). I nt h ec a s ew h e r eb e l i e f sa r eh o m o -
geneous one obtains the result that both agents dominate if and only if β1 = β2 while i
dominates and −i vanishes if and only if βi >β −i. This turnpike result for complete mar-
ket economies is well known (Becker (1980), Rader (1981), and Bewley (1982)). When
beliefs are heterogeneous and β1 = β2 both agents dominate on a path if and only if












< ∞,s u ﬃcient conditions for which
can be found in Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2004).
164.2 THE RESULT
In this section we restrict attention to the case where the agents are equally impatient
and we study the asymptotic behavior of their consumption processes on paths where (a)
the ratio of marginal rates of substitution does not display one period ahead conditional
variability in the limit, and (b) the ratio of marginal utilities does display such variability
inﬁnitely often, i.e. markets are eﬀectively incomplete forever. A third case is (c) where
the ratio of marginal rates of substitution does display variability inﬁnitely often but
only because of the variability in beliefs, a case displaying perverse behaviour that we
shall discuss at some length. Theorem 1 provides a very strong result when markets are
eﬀectively incomplete forever: if the consumption of some agent is uniformly positive
eventually then the consumption of the other agent is zero eventually.
To be more precise, we deﬁne the sets
V0 :=
½
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¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸
(ω) ≥  
¾
.15
Recall that in the case of Pareto optimal allocations, as noted in Remark 3, marginal
rates of substitution are equal at every date-event. In Theorem 1 (i) we show that when








= 1; the result has an interesting implication for the behaviour
of consumption in the case where beliefs are homogeneous and this is discussed later. On
the other hand, for paths in ∪ >0V y
  that satisfy a very weak additional property, either
some agent vanishes or every positive lower bound on consumption is violated inﬁnitely
often for both agents. Evidently, Theorem 1 (ii) can be read as showing that when
markets are eﬀectively incomplete forever, the only equilibria with asymptotically simple
behaviour are the ones in which only one agent consumes in the limit as in the example
and in Theorem 4.
There are two cases to which Theorem 1 (ii) does not apply– (c) above where perverse
behaviour is generated by choosing beliefs appropriately, and paths in ∪ >0V y
  that do not
satisfy an additional property–that we now discuss in detail.
Ω/(∪ >0V y
  ) is the set on which for any economy with homogeneous beliefs, markets
are eﬀectively complete in the limit, i.e. yt/yt−1 does not display one period ahead vari-
ability. In an economy with heterogeneous beliefs it is possible that even though yt/yt−1
converges, the ratio of marginal rates of substitution displays variability, i.e. V sub 6= ∅
where V sub :=
³







and “sub” denotes the perverse behaviour in-
duced by well chosen subjective beliefs. This case, identiﬁed as (c) at the beginning of the
15Since ∪ >0 V  = Ω/V0, V0 and ∪ >0 V  partition the set of paths in accordance with the limiting
behaviour of the variance of the ratio of one period ahead marginal rates of substitution.
17subsection, appears to be very special since the consumption processes in the limit must be
supportable as a Pareto optimal allocation in an economy with homogeneous beliefs even
though marginal rates of substitution do not converge when beliefs are heterogeneous.
This is the ﬁrst case in which Theorem 1 (ii) does not apply.
Also, Theorem 1 (ii) does not apply when we consider the set of paths, V y
∞ below, where
the ratio of marginal utilities displays one period ahead variability inﬁnitely often and yet
for some subsequence of dates the maximal length of the time interval until it displays
variability again diverges on each path. To formalize the notion we need some deﬁnitions.
For  >0 and every ω ∈ V y
  ,d e ﬁne ∆ 
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(ω) ≥  
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as the minimum number of periods it takes for the ratio of marginal utilities to display
one period ahead variability after date t. Clearly, ∆ 
t(ω)i sﬁnite for every  , t and ω ∈ V y
  ;
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The set of paths where the ratio of marginal utilities displays one period ahead vari-
ability inﬁnitely often, ∪ >0 V y
  , can be partitioned into two sets, one containing those
paths where the ratio of one period ahead marginal utilities displays variability on some
bounded interval of time of length T<∞, ∪T, >0 V
y
T, , and its complement, the set V y
∞ on
which supt ∆ 
t(ω)=+ ∞. The interest of studying paths in the set V y
∞ is not evident.16
We turn to the implication of Theorem 1 (i) for consumption behaviour in the case
where beliefs are homogeneous and correct. The fact that, in the case of Pareto optimal
allocations, marginal rates of substitution are equal at every date-event implies that, when
both the agents have positive wealth, both agents have consumption bounded away from
zero. One might conjecture that the same is true for paths in V0 since marginal rates of
substitution are equal in the limit; this is far from obvious and, although we do not have
an example, we believe that on V0 an agent might have consumption that is arbitrarily
close to zero inﬁnitely often or even zero eventually.17
We can now state our main result.
THEOREM 1: Consider an IDC equilibrium. Assume that β1 = β2,t h a tA . 1 ,A . 2 ,A . 3 ,








=1P-a.s. ω ∈ V0.
(ii) for every T<∞,  >0, and n,
limsupt ci,t(ω) ≤ 1/n P-a.s. ω ∈ V
y
T,  ∩ {ω : liminft cj,t(ω) > 1/n}.
16Results on the lack of collinearity of marginal utility vectors in generic ﬁnite horizon incomplete
market economies suggest that the set V y
∞ might even be null for generic economies.
17In the example and in Section 5, since ˆ r2,t(ω)=1a l w a y s ,ˆ r1,t(ω) must display variability to guarantee
that agent 2 vanishes and so, by Proposition 1, yt/yt−1 also displays variability. So, although both parts
of Theorem 1 are compatible with the consumption of an agent being arbitrarily close to zero eventually,
our construction conﬁrms the phenomenon for paths in ∪ >0V y
  , the case covered by Theorem 1 (ii).
18The idea behind the proof of Theorem 1 (i) is a relatively straightforward consequence
of the fact that the ratio of marginal rates of substitution is at least one with positive
conditional probability and on V0 its conditional variance converges to zero. We turn
to the proof of Theorem 1 (ii). First, Lemma 3 uses the fact that the Euler equations
hold with equality and that markets are incomplete to conclude that whenever yt displays
suﬃcient variability conditional on the realization of yt−1, captured by  >0, yt increases
by a factor γ with uniformly positive conditional probability. It follows that, because in
at most T periods yt must display suﬃcient variability, y must increase by the factor γ
with positive conditional probability in any span of T dates. We use this result to show
that, with positive conditional probability, starting from a consumption distribution where
agent 1’s consumption is bounded away from zero, c1,t > 1/n,s ot h a tyt is also bounded
away from zero (yt ≥ y
n in formal terms where y
n is deﬁn e di nt h ep r o o f ) ,i naﬁnite
number of periods yt becomes large enough (yt ≥ yn where the latter is also deﬁned in
the proof) to let us conclude that agent 2’s consumption falls below a pre-ﬁxed threshold
level, c2,t ≤ 1/n. To clinch the result we need to verify that such a possibility occurs
inﬁnitely often. Lemma 2, which is a version of the Second Borel-Cantelli Lemma that
does not require independence and appears in Freedman (1973), lets us prove that in fact
this sort of behaviour of yt does occur inﬁnitely often whenever such starting consumption
distributions occur inﬁnitely often. It follows that if we insist on agent 1 having uniformly
positive consumption inﬁnitely often we violate the hypothesis of Theorem 1 (ii) which
requires that agent 2’s consumption be uniformly positive on every subsequence. The
diﬃcult part of the proof is in specifying an appropriate sequence of events; we consider
the events Ω2,t wherein, starting from a date t0 at which 1’s consumption is above the
threshold, the variable yt never decreases strictly, increases by the factor γ a ﬁxed number
of times τ (where τ is arbitrarily large and so larger than Tn(γ), deﬁned in the proof, which
identiﬁes the number of periods required to make the transition from yn to yn when yt
grows by the factor γ in every period) and increases by that amount at the date that
indexes the event. The analysis of such events suﬃces for our purposes.
Theorem 1 (ii) holds even if the asset return is positive in only two states as that
ensures the required variability. With a single Arrow security that pays in state s the
only restrictions that the Euler equations impose is that yt(ω)=yt+1(ω)i fst+1(ω)=s;
this implies that the support of the equilibrium consumption process is typically ﬁnite in
economies where individual endowments depend only on the current state.18
18Consider a pair (ω,t) such that st(ω)=˜ s ∈ S/{s} and st+τ(ω)=s for all τ ≥ 1, and let yt(ω)=¯ y.
Then, zt+τ(ω)=zs and so yt+τ(ω)=¯ y implies that ci,t+τ(ω)=ci(¯ y) and, therefore, qt+τ(ω)=¯ q.
By the implicit debt constraint, the supporting portfolio θi,t+τ(ω)=θi(¯ y). Since ˜ s 6= s, yt(ω)=¯ y
and ˜ s determine ci,t(ω)=c˜ s
i(¯ y) and hence qt(ω)=q˜ s(¯ y). The portfolio θi,t(ω) must satisfy the budget
equations (where, for ˜ s ∈ S/{s} the agents’ wealth is their endowment) c˜ s
i(¯ y)+q˜ s(¯ y) · θi,t(ω)=z˜ s
i and
ci(¯ y)+¯ q · θi(¯ y)=z1
i + θi,t(ω). For each value of ˜ s ∈ S/{s}, these equations have a unique solution ¯ y˜ s
if q˜ s(¯ y) is either strictly monotone in ¯ y or is constant, which it must be if all risk is idiosyncratic; more
generally, one expects the set of solutions to be ﬁnite typically. Evidently, for any (ω,t0)e i t h e rst(ω)=s
for all t ∈ {0,1,···,t 0} and ¯ ys can be obtained by an analogous argument since θi,−1(ω) = 0, or there
exists t ∈ {1,2,···,t 0 − 1} such that st 6= s and so yt0(ω)=¯ yst.
194.3 RELATING TO EARLIER EXAMPLES
Coury and Sciubba (2005) provide an example where both agents dominate. They
start with a Pareto optimal allocation supportable with incomplete markets and then
change beliefs in a manner that leaves demand unchanged. Market incompleteness makes
this possible; however, the construction is clearly degenerate. Their example corresponds
to the set labelled V sub that we deﬁned and discussed in Section 4.2.
Levine and Zame (2001) provide an example in which both agents dominate. They use
a random selection from a static economy with multiple equilibria to construct a sunspot
equilibrium in the inﬁnite horizon economy. The sunspot realization is ﬁxed once and for
all at the ﬁrst date so markets are eﬀectively complete from then onwards.
Kubler and Schmedders (2002) provide various examples of economies in which both
agents dominate. This is possible because they restrict attention to Arrow securities and
individual endowments depend only on the current state.
Blume and Easley (2004) provide an example where an agent with correct beliefs
vanishes, a phenomenon that is along the lines of our leading example except that their
probabilistic structure is much simpler; also, as the authors note, their construction is not
robust to completing the market since in that case equilibrium fails to exist.
Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) and Krebs (2004b) consider economies like ours but
with a dividend paying asset. Since they allow endowments to grow without any upper
bound, it is not clear that an analogue of Theorem 1 can be proved in their framework.
5. EQUILIBRIA WHERE SOMEONE VANISHES
In this section we turn to our second main result. We will show that the property that
the example displays, namely, that some agent vanishes with probability one, is a robust
implication of market incompleteness. We do so by combining the following two results:
(i) for equilibria where ˆ r2 is a degenerate process, agent 2 vanishes almost surely, and (ii)
there exist open sets of endowment distributions for which one can construct equilibrium
consumption processes with the property that ˆ r2 is degenerate as in the example.
Section 5.1 develops the ﬁrst result which uses the Strong Law of Large Numbers
for uncorrelated random variables with uniformly bounded second moments. Section 5.2
shows that it is possible to construct aggregate feasible consumption processes that satisfy
the Euler equations, that have summable supporting prices, that induce a degenerate
process ˆ r2, and that display certain monotonicity properties. In Section 5.3, we deﬁne
TC0 equilibrium, a weaker notion of equilibrium and Theorem 2 in Section 5.4 provides
conditions that let us identify IDC and TC0 equilibria. Finally, in Section 5.5 we provide
our results. In Theorem 3 we show that for an appropriate distribution of endowments,
we have equilibria without trade in which agent 2 vanishes a.s.; we also specify conditions
such that our construction leads to an IDC equilibrium where agent 2 vanishes a.s. Finally,
in Theorem 4 we provide conditions such that for every no trade equilibrium identiﬁed in
Theorem 3, there is an open set of endowments for which there is a TC0 equilibrium in
which agent 2 vanishes a.s.
20For the main results in this section we shall assume that beliefs are correct so P1 =
P2 = P; when some result holds more generally, we make the more general statement.
5.1 THE STRONG LAW ARGUMENT
If we consider consumption processes for 1 and 2 that satisfy the Euler equations at the
common price process q then, by Proposition 1, for the analysis of survival, it suﬃces to
study the behaviour of an alternative process. We start with a result that puts together
some properties of the alternative process, namely, that ˆ ri is uniformly bounded from
above and that limT→∞Ri,T(ω)i sPi−a.s. ﬁnite. Deﬁne ¯ b ri := supt≥0 ess. supω∈Ω;Pi ˆ ri,t(ω).
PROPOSITION 2: Assume A.1, A.3 and A.5. Then ¯ b ri < ∞. Also, there is a random
variable R∗
i that is nonnegative and a.s. ﬁnite with EPi [R∗
i] ≤ 1s u c ht h a tR∗
i(ω)=
limT→∞Ri,T(ω) Pi−a.s.
By Lemma 1 requiring that agent 2 vanish on ω is equivalent to requiring limt yt(ω)=
∞. So from Proposition 1 (ii) we conclude that










> 0 ⇒ c2,t(ω) →t→+∞ 0.
Evidently, if ˆ r2 is a degenerate process, and β1 = β2, then to show that 2 vanishes a.s. it
suﬃces to show that limsup 1
T
³PT
t=1 log ˆ r1,t(ω)
´
















where the ﬁrst result, with a.s. convergence, would follow from a suitable Strong Law
of Large Numbers, the second uses Jensen’s inequality, and the third uses the deﬁning
property EPi[ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω) = 1. For the inequality to be strict we need to guarantee that
there is variability in the tail of the process {EP1[log ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](ω)}.
ASSUMPTION A.7: {ω :l i m s u p1
T
PT
t=1 EP1[log ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](ω) < 0} = Ω.
When ˆ r2 is a degenerate process, A.7 amounts to the requirement that on almost all
paths, markets never become eﬀectively complete so that complete risk sharing remains
impossible. Jensen’s inequality and EP1[ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](ω) = 1 lead to the weaker property
w h e r et h es e tt h a ta p p e a r si nA . 7i sd e ﬁn e dw i t haw e a ki n e q u a l i t y .
A.7 holds if the time average is uniformly below zero, a strong suﬃcient condition.
Also, when ˆ r2,t(ω)=1 ,A . 7h o l d si frt(ω)=1a n dv a r( Zt|Ft−1) > >0a te v e r yd a t et,
i.e. the asset is a real bond and the endowment process has uniformly positive conditional
variance forever. This is because ˆ r2,t(ω) = 1 implies that c2,t and rt move in the same
direction, and so conditional variability in the endowment guarantees that rt·u0
1(Zt−c2,t)
is nondegenerate. In fact, as we noted in Remark 2, in our leading example A.7 holds and
ˆ r2 is degenerate since rt(ω) · u0
2(c2,t(ω)) is an Ft−1−measurable quantity.
21With A.7 we are able to obtain the result by applying the Strong Law of Large Numbers
for uncorrelated random variables with uniformly bounded second moments. Deﬁne the
set Ai := {ω ∈ Ω :l i m i n fˆ ri,t(ω)=0 }.W eh a v e
PROPOSITION 3: Assume A.1, A.3, A.5 and A.7. Then R1,t(ω) → 0 P1−a.s.ω∈ Ω/A1.
Furthermore, given β1 and  >0, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that
β2 ∈ (δ · β1,β 1) ⇒ P1
Ã(





log ˆ r1,t(ω) < 0
)!
= P1(Ω/A1) −  .






EP1[log ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](ω) ≤  <0
¾
= Ω,
the statement in the second part of Proposition 3 can be strengthened to:
given β1,t h e r ee x i s t sδ ∈ (0,1) such that
β2 ∈ (δ · β1,β 1) ⇒ P1
Ã(





log ˆ r1,t(ω) < 0
)!
= P1(Ω/A1).
The second part of Proposition 3 will be used to show that, at the margin, the turnpike
property fails when markets are incomplete since the less patient agent can survive.
5.2 A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we propose a methodology for constructing feasible consumption processes
that satisfy ˆ r2,t(ω) = 1 for every t ≥ 0 P −a.s.ωin addition to satisfying the Euler equa-
tions and having summable supporting prices.
First, in Proposition 4, we gather together the basic properties of our construction,
namely that the process ˆ r2 is degenerate, a related implication for ˆ r1, that the process
constructed is uniquely deﬁned for each initial condition, that it is monotone increasing
and continuous in the initial condition, and that it has nice boundary behaviour with
respect to the initial condition.
PROPOSITION 4: Assume A.2, A.3, and A.5, and that P1 = P2 = P.F o r Z an
aggregate endowment process, consider a triple (c,t0,ω) ∈ R++×{0,1,2,···}×Ω such that
c ∈ (0,Z t0(ω)). Then there exists a unique pair of feasible consumption processes, denoted
{Ci,t(c,t0,ω)}t≥t0,d e ﬁned only for P−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)) and with C1,t0(c,t0,ω)=c such
that the following statements are true for t ≥ t0 +1P−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)):
(i) ˆ r2,t(ω)=1 ;
(ii) yt−1(ω)=( β2/β1) · ˆ r1,t(ω) · yt(ω);
(iii) if (c,t0,ω)a n d( c0,t 0,ω)a r es u c ht h a tc>c 0 then C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) >C 1,t(˜ ω;c0,t 0,ω);
(iv) the processes {Ci,t(c,t0,ω)}t≥t0 are continuous in c;
(v) given t0, >0, and T>t 0, there exists c>0 such that Zt(˜ ω) − C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) < 
for all t such that T ≥ t ≥ t0 +1 .
(vi) If we also assume A.1 then, given t0,  > 0, and T>t 0, there exists A ∈ FT with
P(A) > 0a n dc>0s u c ht h a tC1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) < for all t such that T ≥ t ≥ t0 +1a n d
P−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ A.
22We now prove that the personalized Arrow-Debreu prices that support the proposed
allocation are summable. To do so we show that the one period undiscounted intertem-
poral rate of substitution for agent 2 is uniformly bounded by M, the number speciﬁed in
A.6, we restrict the discount factors as in A.6, and we use a property of our construction.











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft0
#
(˜ ω) ≤ 1/(1 − βi · M) P − a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(s
t0(ω)).
To apply Proposition 3 to conclude that in our solution agent 2 vanishes a.s. we need
to show that P(A1)=0w h e r eAi := {ω ∈ Ω : liminf ˆ ri,t(ω)=0 }.T h i s i s d o n e b y
showing that since the induced process y does not have zero as a limit point, neither does
c1 have zero as a limit point which implies that zero cannot be a limit point of ˆ r1.
PROPOSITION 6: Assume A.2, A.3, and A.5, and P1 = P2 = P. Then, in the proposed
solution P(A1)=0 .
By combining Propositions 3 and 6 we can conclude that
PT
t=0 logˆ r1,t(ω) →− ∞ .
5.3 TC0 EQUILIBRIUM
We introduce a second notion of equilibrium that does not impose a uniform bound on
the value of debt; instead it imposes a transversality condition at date 0 where a system
of personalized prices is used to evaluate the limiting value of debt.
Recall that P(q;Q) is the set of Arrow price processes compatible with a no arbitrage
asset price process q and the measure Q. We shall assume that beliefs are homogeneous
and correct, P = Pi.D e ﬁne
P1(q;P): =
n








the set of Arrow price processes that are summable with respect to the measure P.





+ :t h e r e e x i s t s θi, with θi,t ∈ Ψt,P ∀t ≥ 0, such that
∀t ≥ 0,c i,t(ω)+qt(ω)·θi,t(ω) ≤ zi,t(ω)+rt(ω)·θi,t−1(ω) P −a.s.ω,
liminfT→+∞ EP
h





For i, ci is a TC0 maximizer given (q,p)i f( i )ci ∈ BCTC
i (q,p)a n d( i i )t h e r ei sn o
other ˜ ci ∈ BCTC



























2,q∗)t h a ti sam a r k e tc l e a r i n g
allocation such that (i) p
c∗
i
i ∈ P1(q∗;P)f o ri ∈ I, and (ii) c∗
i, with supporting portfolio
θ∗
i, is a TC0 maximizer given (q∗,p
c∗
i
i )f o ri ∈ I.
23A TC0 equilibrium diﬀers from an IDC equilibrium only in the form of the additional
condition that ensures that the budget sets are appropriately bounded so that a maximizer
exists. In a TC0 equilibrium this additional condition takes the form of requiring that
the personalized supporting price process for each agent be a summable Arrow price
process, and that the limiting expected value of debt evaluated according to the agent’s
personalized supporting price process be zero. Lemma 17 in the Appendix shows that the
TC0 budget set does not permit Ponzi schemes.
5.4 IDENTIFYING EQUILIBRIA
We turn to a result that lets us identify allocations as IDC and TC0 equilibria. We
rely on a tool also used by Magill and Quinzii (1994), namely, Arrow-Debreu budget sets
induced by personalized Arrow price processes at the no arbitrage price process q.T h e
result will be used only in the case where beliefs are correct and hence stated as such.





















Summability of the personalized prices, pi ∈ P1(q;P), together with nonnegativity of
i’s endowment process, A.2, ensures that the value on the right is well deﬁned and ﬁnite.
THEOREM 2: Assume A.3 and that beliefs are correct, P1 = P2 = P. Consider con-
sumption processes b ci, i ∈ I, that are feasible and an asset price process b q such that, for
each i ∈ I,t h e r ee x i s t sb pi ∈ P1(b q;P)s u c ht h a tb ci is a maximizer on the set BCAD
i (b pi),
and let b θi be a portfolio process that supports b ci at the price process b q.T h e n
(i) (b c1, b c2, b θ1, b θ2, b q) constitute a TC0 equilibrium;
(ii) if for i =1 ,2l i m T→+∞ EP
h
b pi,T · b qT · b θi,T|Ft
i
(ω) = 0 for all t ≥ 1a n dP−a.s. ω,t h e n
(b c1, b c2, b θ1, b θ2, b q) constitute an IDC equilibrium.
The theorem is proved by showing that since b ci is a maximizer on the set BCAD
i (b pi)a n d
it satisﬁes the sequence constraints in the set BCi(b q) with supporting asset portfolio b θi,t h e
transversality condition limT→+∞ EP
h
b pi,T · b qT · b θi,T|F0
i
(ω)=0h o l d s .S ob ci ∈ BCTC
i (b q, b pi).
Also, for pi ∈ P(q;P), BCTC
i (q,pi)i sc o n t a i n e dBCAD
i (pi). So b ci is a maximizer on the
set BCTC
i (b q, b pi) Theorem 2 (i) follows as a direct consequence. As for Theorem 2 (ii), one
shows easily that the transversality condition holds at every t ≥ 0, and the result follows
from Theorem 5.2 in Magill and Quinzii (1994); their result applies since, as they note,
preferences with discounted additively separable expected utility representations satisfy
the assumption of uniform impatience.19
L e m m a2 0i nt h eA p p e n d i xp r o v i d e ss u ﬃcient conditions for verifying that a ci is a
maximizer on BCAD
i (b pi).
19Conversely, as Magill and Quinzii (1994) note, if we consider an IDC equilibrium and summable
supporting Arrow price processes then, necessarily, the transversality condition holds at every node.
245.5 THE RESULT
We turn to our second main result which restricts attention to the case where both
t h ea g e n t sh a v ec o r r e c tb e l i e f sa n ds h o w st h a t the phenomenon exhibited in the leading
example and identiﬁed in Theorem 1 (ii), wherein an agent vanishes almost surely, is a
robust possibility.
Theorem 3 invokes Theorem 2 (ii) to conclude that quite generally an economy has a
continuum of endowment distributions at each of which there is a no trade IDC equilibrium
in which agent 2 vanishes a.s. It also provides conditions, that include the special case
where agent 2 has a logarithmic Bernoulli function and an endowment at only date 0
where the same result holds. The only element that is new here is a proof of the fact that
under the conditions speciﬁed in Theorem 3 (i), a transversality condition can be shown
to hold at every date and event; that result is proved as Lemma 21 in the Appendix.
THEOREM 3: Assume A.1-3, A.5-7, β1 ≥ β2,a n dP1 = P2 = P. Also assume that either
one of the following two conditions holds:















2 · ¯ c2,τ,
(ii) zc
1 = {C1,t(c,0,ω)}t≥0 for some c ∈ (0,Z 0(ω)) so that the proposed solution is sup-
ported as a no trade equilibrium.
Then the economy has an IDC equilibrium in which agent 2 vanishes almost surely.
Case (ii) guarantees that our construction is not vacuous. The condition in case (i)
holds if u2(x)=l o gx and z2,t(ω)=0f o rt ≥ 1. So the example in Section 3 generalizes
to arbitrary nonnegative asset payoﬀs and arbitrary characteristics for agent 1.
Theorem 4 shows that for every endowment distribution in some neighbourhood of an
endowment distribution that is supported as a no trade IDC equilibrium, there exists a
TC0 equilibrium. The proof uses A.4, which imposes a bound on the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, to show that for the allocation identiﬁed in Theorem 3, the value of excess
demand evaluated using the personalized Arrow-Debreu price process of each agent is
monotone in a single parameter; furthermore,t h ev a l u ei sc o n t i n u o u sa n dh a st h er i g h t
boundary behaviour.20 The rest of the proof consists in manipulating the allocation by
starting at date 1 and using the fact that markets are incomplete to conclude that one can
choose consumption at date 0 in a manner that is consistent with feasibility and the Euler
equations. This reduces the problem to that of a ﬁxed point problem in two dimensions
which, by continuity, has a solution for endowments in a neighbourhood of the no trade
endowments since no trade is a solution by Theorem 3.
Deﬁne the space of endowment distributions compatible with the aggregate endowment
process Z as Z1(Z): ={(z1,0,z 1,1,···) ∈ Ψ+ :( Z0 − z1,0,Z 1 − z1,1,···) ∈ Ψ+}.
20Under A.4 the proof of Theorem 4 goes through even when an agent has a zero endowment at every
date and event; this shows quite clearly that in general A.4 can be weakened as we noted in Remark 1.
25THEOREM 4: Assume A.1-7, β1 ≥ β2,a n dP1 = P2 = P.L e t( z∗
1,z∗
2)=( {C1,t(c∗,0,ω)}t≥0,
{C2,t(c∗,0,ω)}t≥0)f o rs o m ec∗ ∈ (0,Z 0(ω)). There exists N(z∗
1)a no p e ns u b s e to fZ1(Z)
such that for every (z1,z 2), where z1 ∈ N(z∗
1)a n dz2 := Z − z1,t h e r ee x i s t saT C 0
equilibrium in which agent 2 vanishes with probability one.
REMARK 5: It follows from Remark 4 that a continuity argument can be used to provide
analogues of Theorems 3 and 4 in the case where β1 <β 2 but suﬃciently close; this
generalizes a property that the example in Section 3 displayed.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered an inﬁnite horizon economy with incomplete markets with two agents
and one good and we characterized the asymptotic behaviour of equilibrium consumption.
Our main result shows that on any equilibrium path on which some agent’s consumption
is bounded away from zero eventually, the other agent’s consumption must be zero even-
tually. This result highlights the relevance of market incompleteness, when it is eﬀective
forever, since from it one concludes that either one of the two agents will eventually cease
to consume, or the equilibrium is complicated in the sense that the consumption of both
the agents is arbitrarily close to zero inﬁnitely often. We also show that for a robust
class of economies with incomplete markets there are equilibria in which an agent’s con-
sumption is zero eventually with probability one even though she has correct beliefs and
is marginally more patient. Our results help to disentangle the role played by the het-
erogeneity of beliefs from that played by the market structure in determining the fate of
an agent. They suggest that savings behaviour is determined by market incompleteness
rather than by marginal diﬀerences of opinions. Evidently, the MSH and the Ramsey
conjecture can hold in a robust sense only if the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
When utility is unbounded below, Theorem 1 (ii) implies that the continuation utility
is arbitrarily low inﬁnitely often. This can be interpreted as showing that the implicit
punishment required to ensure that an agent continues to participate in the market is the
conﬁscation of her entire endowment, i.e. the maximal possible punishment.21
We believe that Theorem 1 holds in a wide class of models where markets are eﬀectively
incomplete and the Euler equation holds with equality always. Since the result is based
on pairwise comparisons of the agents’ marginal rates of substitution, we conjecture that
with any ﬁnite number of agents, goods and numeraire assets, provided some asset has
strictly positive returns in at least two states, at most one agent’s consumption can be
uniformly bounded away from zero eventually. However, it is not clear that Theorems 3
and 4 generalize since the proofs use the fact that there are only two agents.
Our approach does not cover models where the Euler condition holds as an inequality.
Given the prevalence of such models in the literature on computational general equilibrium
and macroeconomics, it would be useful to characterize the asymptotic properties of
consumption in such models; perhaps our techniques can be adapted to such situations.
21We are indebted to Emilio Espino for this observation.
26APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
That EPi [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω) = 1 follows from the deﬁnition of the process ˆ ri.




























(ii) Under A.2 and A.3 u0
i(ci,t(ω)) is uniformly positive. So, invoking A.5, we have































so that the ratio yt−1/yt, adjusted by the discount factors, equals the ratio between the



























and the ﬁrst result in (iii) follows by using the fact that EPi [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω) = 1. The second
result in (iii) is proved in a similar manner.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1














































So there exists a process {λt}t≥0 such that λt is Ft−measurable and for every  >0t h e r e





ˆ r1,t(ω) − λt−1(ω)
¯ ¯ ¯ <  .It follows that
t>t ( ,ω) ⇒ (λt−1(ω)− )·P1,t(ω)·ˆ r1,t(ω) <P 2,t(ω)·ˆ r2,t(ω) < (λt−1(ω)+ )·P1,t(ω)·ˆ r1,t(ω).
27Since λt−1 is Ft−1−measurable, we have t>t ( ,ω) implies
(λt−1(ω) −  ) · EP1 [ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](ω) <E P2 [ˆ r2,t|Ft−1](ω) < (λt−1(ω)+ ) · EP1 [ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](ω).
Since EPi [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω)=1a n d >0 is arbitrary, we have λt−1 =1P−a.s. ω ∈ V0.I t








(ii) We start with three results that we will need. The ﬁrst is Levy’s conditional form of
the Second Borel-Cantelli Lemma which follows from a more general result due to Freed-
man (1973 Proposition 39). The second result puts bounds on the conditional probability
with which there is variability in yt/yt−1. The third, shows that on any path on which
some event occurs inﬁnitely often, the event consisting of the ﬁrst event followed by any
ﬁnite string of realizations of yt such that yt/yt−1 ≥ 1a l s oo c c u r si n ﬁnitely often.















yt0−1(ω) ≥ 1, ∀t0 = t +1− N,···,t
o
.
LEMMA 2: Let {Ωt}∞
t=0 be a sequence of events adapted to the ﬁltration {Ft}∞
t=0.T h e n
∞ X
t=1





E [1Ωt |Ft−1](ω)=+ ∞
¾
.




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸







¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸
(ω) ≥  >0 implies that there exists γ>0 such that
P
∙
1 − γ ≥
yt
yt−1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸
(ω) ≥ p > 0.









Since for all t ≥ 1a n dP−a.s. ω ∈ Ω, EPi [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω)=1 ,i =1 ,2, under A.1 the
ﬁr s tr e s u l tf o l l o w s .















LEMMA 4: Let {Ωt}∞
t=0 be a sequence of events adapted to the ﬁltration {Ft}∞





1,t(e ω)=+ ∞ P − a.s. e ω ∈ {Ωt i.o.}.
PROOF: As an implication of Lemma 3 we have












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸
(ω) ≥ p > 0,
w h e r ew eu s et h ec o n v e n t i o nt h a tΩ0







(ω) is non-negative otherwise.
28For e ω ∈ {Ωt i.o.} arbitrarily chosen, there exists a sequence {tk}
∞
k=1 such that e ω ∈ Ωtk
for every k =1 ,2,···.S i n c e Ω0
1,t = Ω, e ω ∈ Ω(tk+1)−1 ∩ Ω
1−1
1,(tk+1)−1 and therefore, by the

























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ftk
¸
(e ω)=+ ∞
and it follows by Lemma 2 that
P∞
t=1 1Ωt−1∩Ω1
1,t(e ω)=+ ∞ P − a.s. e ω ∈ {Ωt i.o.}.
Suppose that the result holds for N −1. So, for P-a.s e ω ∈ {Ωt i.o.} arbitrarily chosen
there exists {tk}
∞
k=1 such that e ω ∈ Ωtk−(N−1) ∩ Ω
N−1
1,tk = Ω(tk+1)−N ∩ Ω
N−1
1,(tk+1)−1 so that, by

























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ftk
¸
(e ω)=+ ∞
and it follows by Lemma 2 that
P∞
t=1 1Ωt−N∩ΩN
1,t(e ω)=+ ∞ P − a.s. e ω ∈ {Ωt i.o.}.T h a t
completes the induction argument and the proof.
Since the gist of the argument underlying the proof of Theorem 1 (ii) was given in













.F o rγ>0i d e n t i ﬁed
in Lemma 3, let Tn(γ)s a t i s f yy
n · (1 + γ)Tn(γ) > yn. For the rest of the proof, the values
of  , T, n, and the value of γ induced by  , will be considered to be ﬁxed. Recall that T
is a uniform upper bound on the number of periods with variability less than  .D e ﬁne
C
1,n






. Without loss of
generality we identify agent 2 as j.
For (ω,t,τ) such that
yt(ω)
















yt0−1(ω) ≥ 1+γ, t0 = t0,···,t
¾













ω : yt (ω) ≥ y







{ω : c2,t(ω) ≤ 1/n} i.o.
o
.

















{ω : c2,t(ω) ≤ 1/n} i.o.
o

















∩ {ω : liminft c2,t(ω) > 1/n} has measure zero.
The proof will be by induction on τ and the following two facts will be used.




















where tk ∈ {t0
k +1 ,t 0
k +2 ,···,t 0
k + T}. This can be proved by noting that (i) by the
29deﬁnition of T, for every k there necessarily exists tk ∈ {t0
k +1 ,t 0
k +2 ,···,t 0
k + T} such
that e ω ∈
n










, and (ii) e ω ∈ ΩT
1,t0





k +1≤ tk ≤ t0
k + T.
















w h e r ew eu s et h ec o n v e n t i o n st h a tΩ0
2,t = C
1,n
t to handle the case where τ =0a n dt h a t
Ω0












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
¸
(e ω) ≥ p > 0.



















, there exists a sequence {t0
k}
∞

































for some sequence {tk}
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We turn to the second step. So suppose it is true that
P∞
t=1 1Ωτ
2,t(e ω)=+ ∞ P-












1,t(e ω)=+ ∞ P-a.s.










































for some sequence {tk}
∞

























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ftk−1
¸
(e ω)=+ ∞
and it follows from Lemma 2 that
P∞
t=1 1Ωτ+1









This completes the induction on τ.
Hence, for every τ ≥ 0,
P∞
t=1 1Ωτ+1




























P-a.s. e ω ∈ V
y
T,  ∩ {ω : limsupt c1,t(ω) > 1/n} as required.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The proof follows from Lemma 5 and 6. Lemma 5 shows that if asset returns are non-
negative and the one period ahead conditional probability that state s occurs is uniformly
p o s i t i v e ,A . 1 ,t h e nˆ ri,t(ω) is nonnegative and uniformly bounded above. Lemma 6 uses
the martingale convergence theorem to show that limT→∞Ri;0,T(ω)i sPi−a.s. ﬁnite.
30LEMMA 5: Assume A.3 and r ≥ 0. Then 0 ≤ ˆ ri,t(ω) ≤ 1/Pi,t(ω). Hence, under A.1, A.3,
and A.5, ¯ b ri < ∞.











LEMMA 6: Assume A.3 and r ≥ 0. Then there is a random variable R∗
i that is nonneg-
ative and a.s. ﬁnite with EPi [R∗
i] ≤ 1 such that R∗
i(ω) = limT→∞Ri,T(ω) Pi−a.s.
PROOF: Under the stated condition, {Ri,t} is a nonnegative martingale since EPi [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1]=
1. Since supt≥1 EPi [Ri,t]=1< +∞, the Martingale Convergence Theorem applies.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let us deﬁne a sequence of truncated processes parameterized by  >0 by setting
g 





Ω can be partitioned into three sets: ∪n≥1B1,1/n, A1,a n dΩ/(A1∪(∪n≥1B1,1/n)), where
A1 := {ω ∈ Ω : liminf ˆ r1,t(ω)=0 }.W eﬁrst show that under A.7 the third set is null.
LEMMA 7: Assume A.7. Then Ω/A1 ⊂∪ n≥1B1,1/n,w h e r eA1 := {ω : liminf ˆ r1,t(ω)=0 },
so that for all ω ∈ Ω/A1 there exists  (ω) such that ω ∈ B1, (ω).
PROOF: Consider ˜ ω ∈ Ω/A1. So liminf ˆ r1,t(˜ ω)=2·  (˜ ω) > 0a n dt h e r ee x i s t st(˜ ω)s u c h






EP1[log ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](˜ ω)
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EP1[log ˆ r1,t|Ft−1](˜ ω)
¶
























1,t |Ft−1](˜ ω) < 0
so that ˜ ω ∈ B1, (˜ ω) as required.
31We continue with the proof of Proposition 3.
Since  <  0 ⇒ g 
1,t(ω) ≤ g 0
1,t(ω) ∀t, ∀ω, it follows that  <  0 ⇒ B1, 0 ⊂
B1, .S o B1,1/n ⊂ B1,1/(n+1) ⊂ ···,a n dw es e tB1,0 := ∪n≥1B1,1/n. It follows that
P1(B1,1/n/A1) increases monotonically to P1(B1,0/A1). So for all p>0, there exists
 (p) such that P1(B1, (p)/A1) ≥ P1(B1,0/A1) − p.





earlier. It is uniformly bounded below and, under A.1, A.3, and A.5, by Lemma 5, it











1,t (ω) − EP1 [g
 (p)
1,t |Ft−1](ω).









1,t+k|Ft−1] = 0 for all k ≥ 1, for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, by the Strong Law of Large
Numbers for uncorrelated random variables with uniformly bounded second moments


































1,t (ω) →− ∞so that ∀ω ∈ B1, (p)/A1,
PT
t=1 log ˆ r1,t(ω)= →− ∞since
PT







1,t (ω) →− ∞ . The proof of the ﬁr s tp a r ti s
completed by noting that as p goes to zero, we approximate the set Bi,0/Ai and, by
Lemma 7, that set coincides with Ω/A1.
For the second part we set C1,δ := {ω ∈ Ω : limsup 1
T
PT
t=1 log ˆ r1,t(ω) < logδ}∩(Ω/A1).
Clearly, δ0 <δ 00 implies that C1,δ0 ⊂ C1,δ00. It follows that ∪n≥1C1,1−1/n = Ω/A1 and hence
that P1(C1,1−1/n) increases monotonically to P1(Ω/A1)s ot h a tf o ra l l >0, there exists
δ =1− 1/n such that P1(C1,δ) ≥ P1(Ω/A1) −  .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
We give an outline of the proof. In Lemma 8 we show that one can work with the
process c1 and the process y interchangeably. Lemma 9 is the crucial step in which we
study the parameterized ﬁxed point of a special one dimensional map. Lemma 10 takes
the ﬁx e dp o i n tf o u n di nL e m m a9a n dd e d u c e sp r o p e r t i e si n d u c e db yi to nc o n s u m p t i o n ,
marginal utility, Euler equations, etc. A recursive application of Lemma 10 going forward
leads us to most of the properties in Proposition 4 including monotonicity and continuity
in the initial value. Lemma 11 provides the boundary behaviour properties.
Throughout we write E[X] instead of EP[X].





LEMMA 8: Assume A.3. YZ is increasing in c1, it is onto, and continuous with a contin-
uous inverse.
PROOF: The result is a consequence of A.3; in particular, we use the fact that ui are
strictly concave, continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisfy the Inada condition at c =0 .
Given Z and feasible consumption processes, by Lemma 8, for any (t,ω)w eh a v e
yt(ω)=YZt(ω)(c1,t(ω)). The inverse of YZ is denoted (YZ)−1(y); by Lemma 8, it is well
deﬁned and continuous.
Proposition 4 is proved by using a recursive construction in the variable yt(ω)w h i c h ,
by Lemma 8, is equivalent to using the variable c1,t(ω). However, to establish the basic
properties of the construction, it is easier to work with the variable λ := r · u0
2(c2)/y.
Lemma 9 studies the existence and monotonicity properties of the ﬁxed point in λ of a
special function.




y and consider the function ft,ω,y :[ λ(t,ω,y),+∞) → [(β1/β2)·r ·
u0
1(¯ z),+∞)i nt h ev a r i a b l eλ deﬁned by













!!¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft−1
#
(ω).
Then (i) ft,ω,y has a unique ﬁxed point denoted λ∗(t,ω,y),
(ii) λ∗(t,ω,y) > maxω0∈Ω(st−1(ω))
rt(ω0)·u0
2(Zt(ω0))
y and λ∗(t,ω,y) > (β1/β2) · r · u0
1(¯ z),
(iii) y · λ∗(t,ω,y) >y 0 · λ∗(t,ω,y0)i fa n do n l yi fλ∗(t,ω,y) <λ ∗(t,ω,y0), in particular
y>y 0 if and only if λ∗(t,ω,y) <λ ∗(t,ω,y0),
(iv) λ∗(t,ω,y) is continuous in y,
(v) λ∗(t,ω,y) →y→0 ∞,a n d
(vi) λ∗(t,ω,y) · y →y→∞ ∞.
PROOF: Notice that even though the domain of the function ft,ω,y is Ft−measurable, the
function is deﬁned in a manner that makes it Ft−1−measurable. This is important.







(ω)=∞, where we use the Inada condition; furthermore,
ft,ω,y is continuous and strictly decreasing. Under A.2 and A.3 (β1/β2) · ¯ r · u0
1(¯ z) < ∞;
therefore, Limλ→∞ft,ω,y(λ) < ∞. It follows that ft,ω,y has a unique ﬁxed point.
(ii) As noted at the beginning of the proof, ft,ω,y is Ft−1−measurable and, therefore, the




y , the highest possible value for λ(t,ω,y). The
second part follows from the fact that ft,ω,y is strictly decreasing.
(iii) Suppose that y · λ∗(t,ω,y) >y 0 · λ∗(t,ω,y0). Since ft,ω,y is strictly decreasing, and














(iv) Notice that by (i), λ∗(t,ω,y)e x i s t sf o ra l ly>0, and by the monotonicity result
in (iii), the only sorts of discontinuities that are possible are of the ﬁrst kind. So if
λ∗(t,ω,·) is discontinuous at ˜ y then, introducing notation for right-hand and left-hand
limits, λ∗(t,ω, ˜ y−) >λ ∗(t,ω, ˜ y+). So, by (iii), ˜ y− · λ∗(t,ω, ˜ y−) < ˜ y+ · λ∗(t,ω, ˜ y+)a n d
therefore λ∗(t,ω, ˜ y−) <λ ∗(t,ω, ˜ y+)s i n c e˜ y− =˜ y+. The contradiction that results shows
that such discontinuities are not present.
(v) Since λ(t,ω,y) →y→0 ∞, we can use (ii) to conclude that λ∗(t,ω,y) →y→0 ∞.
(vi) Notice that λ∗(t,ω,y) →y→∞ 0r e q u i r e st h a tft,ω,y(λ∗(t,ω,y)) → 0w h i c hc a n n o t
hold under A.2, since r > 0, A.3, since u1 is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and
A.5, since ¯ z<∞.H e n c e ,λ∗(t,ω,y) →y→∞  >0a n ds oλ∗(t,ω,y) · y →y→∞ ∞.
The next result induces values for consumption at the ﬁxed point identiﬁed in Lemma 9
and speciﬁes the implications on intertemporal marginal utilities induced by those values.










,c 1,t(ω): =Zt(ω)−c2,t(ω),y t(ω)=YZt(ω)(c1,t(ω)).
Then (i) ci,t(ω) ≥ 0a n di sFt−measurable, (ii) if yt−1(ω) >y 0
t−1(ω) then the induced values
satisfy yt(ω) >y 0




(β1/β2) · E[rt · u0
1(c1,t)|Ft−1](ω)s ort(ω) · u0
2(c2,t(ω)) is Ft−1−measurable and ˆ r2,t(ω)=
1 P − a.s.ω,a n d( v )yt(ω)=
β1
β2 · 1
ˆ r1,t(ω) · yt−1(ω).


















so that using the fact that u2 i sc o n c a v ew ec a nc o n c l u d et h a tc2,t(ω) ≤ Zt(ω)s ot h a t
c1,t(ω) ≥ 0. The Inada condition guarantees that c2,t(ω) ≥ 0. Since the measurability
property is evident, the proof of (i) is complete.









From the speciﬁcation of ft,ω,y and the fact that u1 is strictly concave, it is easy to see
that, necessarily, c1,t(ω) >c 0
1,t(ω). An application of Lemma 8 completes the proof.
(iii) Follows form Lemma 9 (iv), the fact that ui are twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
and Lemma 8.







=( β1/β2) · E[rt · u
0
1(c1,t)|Ft−1](ω).
This shows that rt(ω) · u0
2(c2,t(ω)) is Ft−1−measurable and so ˆ r2,t(ω)=1 P − a.s.ω.





















Proposition 4 is proved by recursively applying Lemma 10. For existence we assume
that we are given a triple (y,t0,ω) ∈ R++ ×{ 0,1,2,···}×Ω,w es e tyt0(ω): =y and
treat it as a parameter and apply Lemma 10 (i) to induce a unique process for {yt(˜ ω)}t≥t0
and P−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)). By Lemma 8 this is equivalent to starting with a triple
(c,t0,ω) ∈ R++ ×{ 0,1,2,···}×Ω with the additional condition that c ∈ (0,Z t0(ω)),
setting c1,t0(ω): =c and treating it as a parameter and generating a unique pair of
processes ci that are feasible and solve the ﬁxed point problem at each date t ≥ t0 +1
and P−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)).
The notation {Ci,t(c,t0,ω)}t≥t0, where the process is deﬁned P−a.s. only for ˜ ω ∈
Ω(st0(ω)), was introduced in the statement of Proposition 4. For monotonicity, we consider
two triples (c,t0,ω)a n d( c0,t 0,ω) such that c>c 0. By Lemma 8 the induced values satisfy
yt0(ω) >y 0
t0(ω) so that by an iterative application of Lemma 10 (ii) yt(˜ ω) >y 0
t(˜ ω)f o ra l l
t ≥ t0 +1a n dP−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)). Another application of Lemma 8 establishes that
C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) >C 1,t(˜ ω;c0,t 0,ω)f o ra l lt ≥ t0 +1a n dP−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)).
By a direct argument, for all t ≥ t0 +1a n dP−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)), C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω)i s
continuous in c.
Lemma 11 establishes some boundary properties of the consumption processes that
we construct and completes the proof of Proposition 4.
LEMMA 11: Assume A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.5. (i) Given t0, ,and T,w h e r e >0a n ds m a l l ,
and T>t 0, there exists A ∈ FT with P(A) > 0a n dc>0 such that C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) < 
for all t such that T ≥ t ≥ t0 +1andP−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ A. (ii) Given t0, ,and T,w h e r e >0
and small, and T>t 0, there exists c>0s u c ht h a tZt(˜ ω) − C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) < for all t
such that T ≥ t ≥ t0 +1a n dP−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)).
P R O O F :( i ) B yL e m m a9( v ) ,λ∗(t,ω,y) →y→0 ∞ so that, by the ﬁxed point prop-
erty, ft,ω,y(λ∗(t,ω,y)) →y→0 ∞. But then, under A.2, A.3, and A.5, we must have
E[c1,t|F˜ t−1](ω) →yt−1(ω)→0 0. So for some ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st−1(ω)), c1,t(˜ ω) →yt−1(ω)→0 0, and,
by Lemma 8, yt(˜ ω) →yt−1(ω)→0 0. By recursively using the monotonicity and continu-
ity properties, Lemma 10 (ii) and (iii), we can conclude that for any t>t 0,t h e r ei s
35a˜ ω(t)s u c ht h a tf o ra l lt0 where t ≥ t0 >t 0, yt0(˜ ω(t)) →yt0(ω)→0 0, and, by Lemma 8,
c1,t0(˜ ω(t)) →yt0(ω)→0 0. It follows that given t0, , and T,w h e r e >0 and small, and
T>t 0, there exists ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st−1(ω)) and c>0 such that C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) < for all t such
that T ≥ t ≥ t0 +1 . S i n c eT<∞ a n dA . 1h o l d s ,t h es a m ei st r u ef o ra l l˜ ω ∈ A where
P(A) > 0a n dA ∈ FT.
(ii) By Lemma 9 (vi), the rule deﬁning c2,t(ω) in Lemma 10, and the concavity of u2,
we conclude that c2,t(ω) →yt−1(ω)→∞ 0; by Lemma 8, yt(ω) →yt−1(ω)→∞ ∞.B yr e c u r s i v e l y
using the monotonicity and continuity properties, Lemma 10 (ii) and (iii), we can conclude
that for any t>t 0, yt(ω) →yt0(ω)→∞ ∞,a n d ,b yL e m m a8 ,yt0(ω) →c→Zt0(ω) ∞. It follows
that given t0, ,and T,w h e r e >0 and small, and T>t 0, there exists c>0s u c ht h a t
Zt(˜ ω) − C1,t(˜ ω;c,t0,ω) < for all t such that T ≥ t ≥ t0 +1a n dP-a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(st0(ω)).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The proof follows from Lemma 12 and Lemma 13. To simply the notation we use
ci,t(ω) for consumption and state and prove the results for the case where t0 =0a n dt h e
processes are deﬁned on Ω. Throughout we write E[X] instead of EP[X].






≤ M := max











PROOF: If not then there is an A with P(A) > 0, such that for every ω ∈ A there exists

































































⇒ E[rt(ω)+1 · u
0
1(c1,t(ω)+1)|Ft(ω)](ω) > ¯ r · u
0
1(z/2)





1(z/2) ⇔ c1,t(ω)+1(˜ ω) <z /2 ≤ Zt/2
⇔ c2,t(ω)+1(˜ ω) >Z t/2 ≥ z/2 ⇒ rt(ω)+1(˜ ω) · u
0














But that contradicts the fact that rt(ω) · u0
2(c2,t(ω)) is always Ft−1-measurable since we




















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯F0
¸
(ω) ≤ 1/(1 − βi · M).
PROOF: We prove the result for i = 1 since it is trivial for i =2 .


















































































w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a tE [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω) = 1 together with the law of iterated expecta-
tions. The result follows by taking the limit.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
The proof follows from Lemma 14-16. Throughout we write E[X] instead of EP[X].
LEMMA 14: Assume A.3 and r ≥ 0. In our construction, P{ω :l i m i n fyt(ω) →t→∞ 0} =
0.
PROOF: Since yT(ω)= 1
ΠT
t=1[ˆ r1,t(ω)] · y0(ω) and since, by Lemma 6, we know that R1,t(˜ ω)
is a.s. bounded, we conclude that liminf yT(ω) > 0a . s .
LEMMA 15: Assume z > 0, r ≥ 0, and A.3. In the proposed solution, P(C1)=0w h e r e
Ci := {ω ∈ Ω : liminf ci,t(ω)=0 }.
PROOF: Given y0,c h o o s eK>0. For any such K let cK > 0 solve the equation
u0
2(z − cK)=u0
1(cK) · y0(˜ ω)/K.
For any ˜ ω ∈ C1 a n ds u c haK there exists a sequence {tK
τ } of periods such that
c1,tK
τ ≤ cK so ytK
τ (˜ ω) ≤ y0(˜ ω)/K. Then Lemma 14 implies that P(C1)=0 .
37LEMMA 16: Assume A.2, A.3, and r ≥ 0. In the proposed solution P(A1)=0 .
PROOF: Since ¯ z<∞,i f ,f o rs o m e˜ ω, liminfˆ r1,t(˜ ω)=0t h e nl i m s u pE[rt·u0
1(c1,t)|Ft−1](˜ ω)=
∞.W es h a l la r g u et h a ti ns u c ha ne v e n tc1 → 0, a zero probability event by Lemma 15.
So suppose ˜ ω is such that limsupE[rt · u0
1(c1,t)|Ft−1](˜ ω)=∞ and liminfc1,t(˜ ω)=2  
for some  >0. It follows that there exists ˜ t such that for t ≥ ˜ t, c1,˜ t(˜ ω) ≥  .C h o o s eδ( )
to satisfy u0







2(δ( )). Necessarily, for some t0 ≥ ˜ t,
E[rt0 · u
0
















· E[rt · u
0
1(c1,t)|Ft−1](ω)
so that for (˜ ω,t0)




2(Zt0−1(˜ ω) −  )
u0
1( )















2(δ( )) = ¯ r · u
0
2(δ( )).



















and therefore, by feasibility, c1,t0(ω0) >




. It follows that
E[rt0 · u
0
1(c1,t0)|Ft0−1](˜ ω) ≤ ¯ r · u
0
1(z − δ( ))
which, using the deﬁnition of δ( ), is a contradiction. We have shown that liminfˆ r1,t(˜ ω)=
0 implies that ˜ ω ∈ Ci,as e tt h a th a sm e a s u r ez e r oa c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a1 5 .
STATEMENT AND PROOF OF LEMMA 17
LEMMA 17: Assume A.1 and A.5. The TC0 budget set does not allow Ponzi schemes.
PROOF: It is easy to show that if θ is a Ponzi scheme at q and p ∈ P(q;P), then
−pt0(ω0)=l i m T→+∞ EP
h









for ω/ ∈ Ω(st(ω0)). By ruling out trivial Arrow price processes and assuming A.1, so that





(ω) < 0 and the proposed Ponzi scheme
entails a plan that is not an element of the budget set BCTC
i (q,p)w i t hp ∈ P(q;P). It
follows that there can be no Ponzi scheme that is TC0 budget feasible.
The same proof, with Pi instead of P, can be used to see that the IDC budget set
does not allow Ponzi schemes. This follows from the fact that with the IDC budget set,
38the uniform bound on debt values implies that a transversality condition holds at date 0
and therefore the argument given for TC0 budget sets applies.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First we state and prove Lemma 18 and Lemma 19.




pi,T · qT · θi,T
¯ ¯ ¯F0
i
(ω)=0 , where θi supports ci at the prices q.
PROOF: Since ci is a maximizer on the set BCAD
i (pi), we have ci ∈ BCAD
i (pi); further-




































[−pi,0 · q0 · θi,0 + pi,1 · r1 · θi,0]+
T X
t=2
[−pi,t−1 · qt−1 · θi,t−1 + pi,t · rt · θi,t−1]




w h e r ew eu s et h ec o n v e n t i o nt h a tθi,−1(ω) = 0. By using the fact that pi ∈ P1(q;P), the





pi,t · (ci,t − zi,t)
¯ ¯ ¯F0
i
(ω) = limT→+∞ EP
h




LEMMA 19: Given q and any pi ∈ P1(q;P), BCTC
i (q,pi) ⊂ BCAD
i (pi).
PROOF: Consider ci ∈ BCTC
i (q,pi)a n dl e tθi denote the corresponding asset holding


















Using the sequence of budget constraints in the deﬁnition of the set BCTC































Since ci ∈ BCTC
i (q,pi)i m p l i e st h a t l i mi n f T→+∞ EP
h
pi,T · b qT ·θi,T
¯ ¯ ¯F0
i
(ω) ≥ 0 P −a.s.ω,
and pi ∈ P1(q;P)i m p l i e st h a tpi is summable while (ci − zi) is uniformly bounded, we
can conclude that ci ∈ BCAD
i (pi).
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: Recall that b θi is the portfolio that supports b ci at the price
process b q.B yL e m m a1 8b ci ∈ BCTC
i (q,pi) and, by Lemma 19, BCTC
i (q,pi) ⊂ BCAD
i (b pi)
39so that b ci is a maximizer on BCTC
i (q,pi). Since the consumption processes are aggregate
feasible and, at every t ≥ 0, θ1,t(ω)+θ2,t(ω)=0P-a.s. ω, which follows from the
fact that the spot market budget constraints are satisﬁed with equality, it follows that
(b c1, b c2, b θ1, b θ2, b q) constitute a TC0 equilibrium proving Theorem 1 (i).
To complete the proof of Theorem 1 (ii), notice that we can use Theorem 5.2 in Magill
and Quinzii (1994) to conclude that since a transversality condition holds at every t for
P-a.s. ω, and preferences are uniformly impatient, there is a uniform bound on the value
of debt where we use the supporting asset portfolio. It follows that b ci is a maximizer on
BCi(b q) and we have an IDC equilibrium.
LEMMA 20: Assume A.2 and A.3 and that P1 = P2 = P. Consider a consump-



















































(ω)=0w eh a v eb ci ∈ BCAD
i (pb c
i).
Deﬁne µi := u0
i(b ci,0(ω)). µi > 0. Clearly, b ci i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt ot h es y s t e mo fﬁrst
order conditions βt
i · u0
i(b ci,t(ω)) = µi · pb c






















is strictly concave in ci. It follows (e.g. Luenberger (1969) Theorem 1 in Section 8.5 and
Lemma 1 in Section 8.7) that the ﬁrst order conditions are suﬃcient to identify a global
maximizer and b ci maximizes the Lagrangean function. Therefore b ci solves the constrained
optimization problem.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Throughout we write E[X] instead of EP[X].











P − a.s.ω .














It follows that the consumption processes satisfy the Euler equations with the price process
q and that also pi are such that the no arbitrage condition holds and hence, since by
40Proposition 5 they are summable, pi ∈ P1(q;P)f o ri ∈ I. Also, using the spot market
budget constraints with asset prices q and consumption process ci, we can construct the
supporting portfolio θi.




(ω)=0 P −a.s. holds,
then ci ∈ BCAD
i (pi).
An application of Lemma 20 shows that the consumption processes proposed are
maximal for each i in BCAD
i (pi). To complete the proof of Theorem 3 we shall apply
Theorem 2 and for that we need to verify that the transversality conditions also hold.
We continue the proof with Lemma 21 and 22.






























where ˆ ri is the process induced by ci.
PROOF: Given any process ci that is an Euler process at the price process q and the































































Using the spot market budget constraints
ci,t(ω)+qt(ω) · θi,t(ω) ≤ zi,t(ω)+rt(ω) · θi,t−1(ω)
which, by monotonicity, hold as equalities, and iterating we obtain
































































2 · ¯ c2,τ,
then for every t ≥ 1L i m T→+∞ E[βT
i · u0
i(b ci,T) · b qT · b θi,T|Ft](ω)=0 P − a.s.ωand the
transversality conditions for both the agents is satisﬁed when we consider the proposed
solution induced by the initial value given by b c2,0(ω).
PROOF: Consider i =2 . S i n c eˆ r2,t(ω)=1 ∀t ≥ 0 P − a.s.ω, the expression obtained


















































,e q u i v a l e n t l y












2 · ¯ c2,τ.
Denote such a value b c2,0(ω) and note that βT
2 · u0
2(b c2,T) · b qT · b θ2,T = −
P∞
τ=T+1 βτ
2 · ¯ c2,τ a
deterministic quantity.
We turn to agent 1. Since the regardless of the value of c2,0, the proposed solution
does not waste resources, the asset holdings are the ones that support the consumption
allocation, and the asset is in zero net supply, it follows that θ1,t(ω)=−θ2,t(ω) for all









1(c1,T) · qT · θ2,T|Ft](ω).

























































2(c2,T) · qT · θ2,T|Ft](ω).

































w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a tE [ˆ ri,t|Ft−1](ω) = 1 together with the law of iterated expecta-
tions and the fact that LimT→∞
P∞
τ=T+1 βτ
2 · ¯ c2,τ =0 .
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The proof uses A.4, which imposes a bound on the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
I ti sb a s e do ns h o w i n gﬁrst, Lemma 23, that for the allocation identiﬁed in Theorem 3,
the value of excess demand evaluated using the personalized Arrow-Debreu price process
of each agent is monotone in a single parameter; furthermore, the value is continuous and
has the right boundary behaviour. We then show how one can start our construction
from date 1, choose consumption at date 0 so as to be compatible with feasibility and the
date 0 Euler equation for each agent, and yet preserve the monotonicity and continuity
properties, Lemma 24. Lemma 25 provides a very simple suﬃcient condition for a ﬁxed
point property to hold. Finally, in Lemma 26 we show that if we start with a no trade
equilibrium then there is a robust method for perturbing the endowment distribution that
leads to the satisfaction of the suﬃcient condition speciﬁed in Lemma 25.
Throughout we write E[X] instead of EP[X].
Consider a value for c0,w h e r e0<c 0 <Z 0 so that c0,2 := Z0−c0 satisﬁes nonnegativity,
and consider c1,w h e r e0<c 1(ω) <Z 1(ω), a nonnegative F1−measurable function. By
Proposition 4 we can induce a consumption process {Ci,t(c1(ω),1,ω)}t≥1 for agent i where
the process is deﬁned P−a.s. only for ˜ ω ∈ Ω(s1(ω)). By varying ω,o n eo b t a i n sa n
aggregate feasible consumption process on the full state space.
For ω ∈ Ω(s1)d e ﬁne
V1,s1(c

































43LEMMA 23: Assume A.1-6. Then, for i =1 ,2a n da l ls1 =1 ,···,S, Vi,s1(c1;z1)i s( i )
well deﬁned, (ii) it is continuous in c1 for every value of z1, (iii) it is continuous in z1 for
every value of c1,( i v )i ti si n c r e a s i n gi nc1(ω)w h e r eω ∈ Ω(s1), and (v) for ω ∈ Ω(s1),
(a) V1,s1(c1;z1) →c1(ω)→0 −∞,
(b) V1,s1(c1;z1) →c1(ω)→Z1(ω) V1,s1(Z1;z1)w h e r eV1,s1(Z1;z1) ∈ (0,∞),
(c) V2,s1(c1;z1) →c1(ω)→0 V2,s1(0;z1)w h e r eV2,s1(0;z1) ∈ (−∞,+∞), and































since c1(ω) <Z 1(ω), a similar result holds for V2,s1(c1;z1).
(i) By Proposition 5, the support price process is summable. By A.2, the individual
endowment process is uniformly bounded. It follows that
































1(c1(ω)) is ﬁnite, since c1(ω) > 0, we conclude
that V1,s1(c1;z1)i sﬁnite. An analogous proof shows that V2,s1(c1;z1)i sﬁnite.
(ii) We shall show that fT
1,s1(c1;z1) is a continuous function of c1 for every T,a n dt h a t
fT
1,s1(c1;z1) → V1,s1(c1;z1) uniformly. It follows that V1,s1(c1;z1) is continuous in c1.A n
analogous argument works for V2,s1(c1;z1).












=s u p c1(ω)∈(0,Z1(ω))
















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=s u p c1(ω)∈(0,Z1(ω)) β
T ·















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤
βT
1 · 2¯ z
1 − β1M
44where we use the fact that the supporting price process is summable, Proposition 5, and









¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ limT→+∞
βT
1 · 2¯ z
1 − β1M
=0 .




1(c1(ω)) is continuous since ui is continuously diﬀerentiable. It follows that fT
1,s1(c1;z1) →
V1,s1(c1;z1) uniformly.
(iii) Given c1, Vi,s1(c1;·)i sl i n e a ri nz1; by Proposition 5, A.2, and the fact noted at the
beginning of the proof, it is bounded. It follows that it is continuous in z1.
(iv) We note two facts. First, each term in each sum is increasing in C1,τ(c1(ω),1,ω)(˜ ω).
To see this, notice that by A.4, c ·u00
i(c)+u0
i(c) > 0 for all c>0s ot h a t ,u s i n gc o n c a v i t y ,
we have c · u00
i(c)+u0
i(c) − Z · u00
i(c) > 0f o rZ>0. It follows that (c − Z) · u0
1(c)i s
increasing in c. Similarly, (Z − c) · u00
i(Z − c)+u0
i(Z − c) > 0f o ra l l0<c<Zso that,
using concavity, we have −(c−Z)·u00
i(Z −c)+u0
i(Z −c)+(−Z +z1)·u00
i(Z −c) > 0f o r
all 0 <c<Zand 0 <z 1 ≤ Z. Therefore, −(c − z1) · u00
i(Z − c)+u0
i(Z − c) > 0a n d ,f o r
0 <c<Z,( c − z1) · u0
1(Z − c) is increasing. Evidently, Zt ≥ z1,t > 0 since the individual
endowment is always nonnegative.
Since the construction in Proposition 4 has the property that C1,τ(c1(ω),1,ω)(˜ ω)i s
increasing in c1(ω), invoking the monotonicity property of each term that we just estab-
lished, we can conclude that V1,s1 is increasing. By the same argument, V2,s1 is increasing.
(v) Since we have already established monotonicity, the limits are well deﬁned though
they could be +∞ or −∞. Using the fact at the beginning of the proof, Proposition 5, and
A.2, we conclude that a truncation argument can be used to establish the limiting values.
Such a truncation argument allows us to use the boundary properties of the construction
established in Proposition 4 (v) and (vi).
For (a) notice that for a ﬁxed T we can ﬁnd  >0s u c ht h a tz1,t(˜ ω) > for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T
and P−a.s. ˜ ω ∈ Ω(s1(ω)). The result follows by applying Proposition 4 (vi) using the
Inada condition for i = 1, and A.1. For (b) we use the fact at the beginning of the proof
and the fact that u0
1(Z1(ω)) < ∞ to conclude that the limit is positive and ﬁnite. For
(c) we use the fact at the beginning of the proof and the fact that u0
2(Z1(ω)) < ∞ to
conclude that the limit is ﬁnite without being able to assign a sign to it. For (d) we use
Proposition 4 (v) and the Inada condition for i =2 .
If the processes constructed with c0,w h e r e0<c 0 <Z 0,a n d{Ci,t(c1(ω),1,ω)}t≥1,
where 0 <c 1(ω) <Z 1(ω)a nF1−measurable function, also satisfy (i) the Euler equation
at date 0 for both the agents, and (ii) the Arrow-Debreu budget constraint for both the
agents, then we have a TC0 equilibrium. This follows from the fact that the processes
constructed in Proposition 4 are feasible and satisfy the Euler equations at every date








































Evidently, all three equations hold at the no trade equilibrium when the endowment
distribution is given by (z∗
1,z∗
2).
Let us ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rt h eE u l e re q u a t i o n sa td a t e0 .
LEMMA 24: Assume A.3 and A.5. Let Z0(ω) > 0a n dZ1 : Ω → R++ beanF1−measurable
function. Then for any c1 : Ω → R++,a nF1−measurable function such that c1(ω) <












Furthermore, the function f is strictly increasing in all of its components.
PROOF: The result follows easily from the intermediate value theorem. The right hand
side of the equation is always well deﬁned and positive, while Lemma 8 guarantees that
t h el e f th a n ds i d ei sc o n t i n u o u sa n dh a s( 0 ,∞) as its image; a solution necessarily exists.
The monotonicity property of the function f f o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a ta s s e tr e t u r n s
are strictly positive, and the uis are strictly increasing and strictly concave.
It follows that it suﬃces to consider a reduced system where the Euler equation is































We have shown that a TC0 equilibrium is induced at the endowment distribution (z1,z 2)
if c1∗ is such that Fi(c1∗;z1)=0f o ri =1 ,2.
LEMMA 25: Assume A.1-6. Let the endowment distribution (z1,z 2)a n db c1 be such that
F1(b c1;z1) ≥ 0a n dF2(b c1;z1) ≤ 0. Then there exists c1∗,a nF1−measurable function such
that 0 <c 1∗(ω) <Z 1(ω), that satisﬁes Fi(c1∗;z1)=0f o ri =1 ,2.
PROOF: The range of the function b c1 has at most S values that correspond to the sets
Ω(s1). Fix all but those that correspond to s1 =1 ,2, and denote those two b c1
a and b c1
b.
B yL e m m a2 4a n dL e m m a2 3( i v ) ,t h eﬁrst term in the expression for F1 is increasing in
each component of the function c1; it follows that it is also bounded above. By Lemma 23
(iv), the second term in the expression for F1 is increasing in the corresponding component
of c1.S oF1 is increasing in each component of the function c1 and F1 →− ∞as c1
a → 0.
By an analogous argument, F2 is increasing in each component of the function c1 and
46satisﬁes the following boundary properties: F2 →∞as c1
a → Z1,a a n di nt h ev i c i n i t yo f
(Z1,a,0), F2(c1;z1) > 0.




If F1(c1;z1) ≥ 0, then, by the monotonicity and boundary properties noted earlier,
there exists a unique ˜ c1,w h e r e˜ c1
a = c1
a and ˜ c1
b <c 1
b,s u c ht h a tF1(˜ c1;z1) = 0. We introduce
the notation h1(c1
a)t od e n o t et h ev a l u e˜ c1
b; the monotonicity property of F1 guarantees
that the function h1 with domain [b c1
a,Z 1,a], where Z1,a denotes the aggregate endowment
at date 1 in the event that corresponds to the label a,i sw e l ld e ﬁned and strictly decreasing
and, by the continuity property, h1 is continuous. Furthermore, by the boundary property
of F1 we have h1(c1
a) →c1
a→Z1,a h1 > 0.
The symmetric result holds for any c1 at which F2(c1;z1) ≤ 0. Since F2(b c1;z1) ≤ 0a n d
F2 is monotone, there exists b b c
1
a > b c1




S);z1) = 0. It follows that
we can deﬁne a continuous function h2 with domain [b b c
1
a,¯ c1
a], where ¯ c1
a <Z 1,a, that is strictly
decreasing and satisﬁes the boundary property h2(c1
a) →c1
a→¯ c1
a 0. Also, h2(b b c
1
a) >h 1(b b c
1
a).
Evidently there is a c1
a




∗); so, Fi(c1∗;z1)=0f o ri =1 ,2.
L e m m a2 5t o g e t h e rw i t hA . 7p r o v i d eas u ﬃcient condition under which a TC0 equi-
librium exists in which agent 2 vanishes with probability one. We now show that the
suﬃcient condition holds for an open set of endowment distributions near a no trade
equilibrium at the endowment distribution (z∗
1,z∗
2).
LEMMA 26: Assume A.1-7. There exists N(z∗
1)a no p e ns u b s e to fZ1(Z)s u c ht h a tf o r
every (z1,z 2), where z1 ∈ N(z∗
1)a n dz2 := Z − z1, there exists a TC0 equilibrium.
PROOF: Fix ˜ s ∈ S and deﬁne ˜ s1 := (s0, ˜ s). Given (η1,η 2) ∈ R2,d e ﬁne
 (η1,η 2;ω): =
η1 · u0
2(z∗
2,0(ω)) − η2 · u0
1(z∗
1,0(ω))






















·  (η1,η 2;ω).





i,0(ω)) ·  
0(η1,η 2;ω)+P(Ω(˜ s




i,1(ω)) ·  (η1,η 2;ω)f o r i =1 ,2.
Now deﬁne a new endowment process (˜ z∗
1, ˜ z∗





1,0(ω) −  












1,t(ω)o t h e r w i s e .
˜ z∗
2 is obtained through the condition ˜ z∗
1+˜ z∗




2 = Z.B yc h o o s i n g
η1 > 0a n dη2 < 0 appropriately we can induce values of  (η1,η 2;ω)a n d 0(η1,η 2;ω)t h a t
are suﬃciently small so that ˜ z∗
i,t (ω )≥ 0 f or b o th the agent s at e ve ryt andω .
47It follows that F1(z∗
1;˜ z∗
1)=η1 > 0a n dF2(z∗
1;˜ z∗
1)=η2 < 0. So the condition in
Lemma 25 is satisﬁed and the economy has a TC0 equilibrium where agent 2 vanishes
with probability one since A.7 also holds. By Lemma 23 (iii) Fi(c1;·) is continuous in z1.
It follows that there exists N,w h e r e˜ z∗
1 ∈ N,a no p e ns u b s e to fZ1(Z), such that for every
(z1,z 2), where z1 ∈ N and z2 := Z − z1, there exists a TC0 equilibrium in which agent 2
dies with probability one. The proof is completed by setting N(z∗
1): =N.
That completes the proof of Theorem 4.
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